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AGAINST DISCOURSE: WHY ELIMINATING 
RACIAL DISPARITIES REQUIRES RADICAL 
POLITICS, NOT MORE DISCUSSION 
Robert F. Weber 
ABSTRACT 
Racial disparity discourse is one of the main modalities through 
which we discuss and experience race and racism in the United 
States today—in discussions with colleagues and friends, in scholarly 
work, on cable news, on social media, and in lecture halls. Despite 
its ubiquity, racial disparity discourse is under-theorized: what, 
exactly, is its intended purpose? This Essay argues that most 
discussion about racial disparities is predicated on the faulty 
premise—grounded in the Habermasian concepts of discourse and 
communicative rationality—that antiracists will convince their 
interlocutors by engaging in a practice of rationalistic discourse 
among participants who share the objective and expectation of 
consensus. Drawing on the work of political philosopher Charles 
Mills and sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Moon-Kie Jung, the 
Essay explains why the pragmatic conditions of possibility for 
discourse of this sort concerning matters related to race in the 
United States are frequently absent.  
Specifically, Mills theorizes that a “racial contract,” saturated 
with racialized hierarchies and subordinating logics, has always 
underwritten the American social contract, leaving in its wake an 
“epistemology of ignorance” that is today responsible for localized 
and global cognitive dysfunctions. Jung develops Bourdieu’s concept 
of doxa to explain how, when it comes to the politics of race in the 
 
 Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Special thanks go to my wife 
Samantha and my sister Zabe for the many hours spent struggling with the outrages that breathed life 
into this project. Their contribution here is testament to the force of discourse, where conditions allow it. 
My gratitude also goes to the editorial staff of the Georgia State University Law Review, for undertaking 
and executing this Symposium in difficult conditions, as well as editing this contribution.  
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United States, individual agency and actions are always mediated by 
a classificatory, schematic, and hierarchical social structure in 
which race frequently plays a decisive organizing role. This Essay 
concludes by recommending that those committed to redressing 
vulnerability, precarity, and disposability along racialized lines 
should not focus their efforts on cobbling together a transracial 
coalition of the discursively convinced. Instead, it is argued that 
attentional and financial resources are better directed to develop and 
reinvigorate a radical, oppositional politics dedicated to eradicating 
racialized hierarchies and those elements of the political economy 
that reciprocally nurture and feed off them. Political theorist Chantal 
Mouffe’s model of “agonistic pluralism,” which centers the 
irreducibly conflictual nature of modern politics and proposes a 
politics that aims to confront and convert rather than to convince, is 
offered as a fruitful theoretical model to underwrite this 
non-discursive, radical politics. 
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Two considerations . . . broke in upon my work and 
eventually disrupted it: first, one could not be a calm, cool, 
and detached scientist while Negroes were lynched, 
murdered and starved; and secondly, there was no such 
definite demand for scientific work of the sort that I was 
doing, as I had confidently assumed would be easily 
forthcoming. I regarded it as axiomatic that the world 
wanted to learn the truth and if the truth was sought with 
even approximate accuracy and painstaking devotion, the 
world would gladly support the effort. This was, of course, 
but a young man’s idealism, not by any means false, but 
also never universally true.1 
I began to realize that I had overworked a theory—that the 
cause of the problems was the ignorance of people; that the 
cure wasn’t simply telling people the truth, it was inducing 
them to act on the truth. . . . It wasn’t enough, in other 
words, simply to study the Negro problem and put the truth 
before people. . . . [Y]ou’ve got to do something about it.2  
W.E.B. Du Bois 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The organizing theme of the Georgia State University Law 
Review’s 2021 Symposium asked, “What’s Next for Social Justice 
 
 1. W.E.B. DU BOIS, DUSK OF DAWN: AN ESSAY TOWARD AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A RACE 
CONCEPT 34–35 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007) (1940). 
 2. COLUM. U. ORAL HISTORY PROJECT, REMINISCENCES OF W.E.B. DU BOIS 146–47 (1960) (on 
file with the Georgia State University Law Review) (emphasis added). In both of these epigraph 
remarks, Du Bois is reminiscing on the jarring experience of having prepared an objective and 
contextual summary of a violent episode involving a Black man named Sam Hose accused of rape and 
murder for the city’s most important newspaper, only to discover, while walking his manuscript to the 
newspaper headquarters, that Hose had already been lynched and that his knuckles were on display in a 
butcher shop on the very street Du Bois was walking. See id. at 147–49; DU BOIS, supra note 1, at 34. 
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and Racial Equality?”3 This question has an august pedigree when it 
comes to America and race; it was on the forefront of Dr. Martin 
Luther King Jr.’s mind in 1967, the year before his assassination: 
Where Do We Go from Here?, read the title of his final book.4 
Following the convulsive protests in the Summer of 2020, the 
importance of the question requires no further elaboration. What does 
require some reflection, though, is what the terms of the discussion 
should be. For instance, social justice and racial equality refer to 
distinct political objectives that are intrinsically interrelated, but in 
complicated ways. Further, the concept of racial justice straddles 
both social justice and racial equality, but is also easily 
distinguishable from both. 
Projecting the future trajectories of these concepts, as well as the 
future experiences of the real people whose material conditions will 
answer the Symposium’s question, requires us to wrestle with the 
categories of race, class, justice, equality, and political strategy. For 
progressive legal scholars, the need to settle some of these 
interpretive questions is especially pressing. Law can be a 
problematic category in the context of race and class,5 and it might 
distract us from being able to provide real assistance to those 
engaged in organizing and other political work. We need to conceive 
of the role of law and legal reform in responding to racial and 
economic injustice as downstream of politics. In other words, 
lawyers who are committed to antiracist politics need to specify a 
racial politics before making the case for legal reform. Still, lawyers 
 
 3. Symposium, GA. ST. U. L. REV, https://gsulawreview.org/pages/143-symposium 
[https://perma.cc/R6YX-C39H].  
 4. See generally MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE: CHAOS OR 
COMMUNITY? (1967).  
 5. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness As Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714 (1993) (“After 
legalized segregation was overturned, whiteness as property evolved into a more modern form through 
the law’s ratification of the settled expectations of relative white privilege as a legitimate and natural 
baseline.”); Robert W. Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE POLITICS OF 
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 641, 652 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (“Legal ideology provides 
false legitimation when it conceals the violent, coercive, arbitrary, and ugly faces of existing institutions. 
It reinforces false necessity by suppressing the alternative arrangements, the more democratic, 
egalitarian, cooperative, liberating alternatives, that our legal norms and practices also make 
available . . . .”). 
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and legal theory play a pivotal role in constructing and navigating the 
institutions within which any such politics takes shape—in fostering 
the development of what Roberto Unger calls the “institutional 
imagination” of society, the sense for what practical institutional 
alternatives are possible.6 Lawyers objecting to the continued 
salience of race in the distribution of social resources, chances, and 
vulnerabilities should pick our partners judiciously. 
One task that will help us begin to understand the sociopolitical 
significance of the present moment is to parse and map the 
deployment of racial disparities data in political discourse. The 
experience of Black Americans has often been articulated in the 
language of disparity, reflecting the reality that one of the bedrock 
features of American history has been the absolute and relative 
immiseration of the subset of the population ascriptively denoted as 
Black.7 For instance, W.E.B. Du Bois wrote in 1903 that “[t]o be a 
poor man is hard, but to be a poor race in a land of dollars is the very 
bottom of hardships.”8 A half-century later, Dr. King echoed the 
same sentiment: “Poverty is a glaring, notorious reality . . . . [I]t is 
poverty amid plenty. It is poverty in the midst of an affluent society, 
and I think this is what makes for great frustration and great despair 
in the black community and the poor community of our nation 
generally.”9 And the sentiment is hardly limited to the economic 
realm of income and wealth in Du Bois’s “land of dollars.”10 In a 
 
 6. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT: ANOTHER 
TIME, A GREATER TASK 29–31 (2015); cf. Jack Balkin, Critical Legal Theory Today, in ON 
PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW 64, 67 (Francis J. Mootz III ed., 2009) (arguing that even though law 
can “disguise, mystify, and legitimate great injustices,” it can also help us to create new “discursive and 
institutional tools to talk back to power” and to imagine “finer, better visions of human association”). 
 7. Throughout this Essay, I adopt the convention to capitalize the terms “White” and “Black” to 
refer to people ascriptively assigned to those categories, as well as to the cultures and histories 
developed around those categories to which those terms also descriptively refer. I do so with 
ambivalence, both appreciative of the recognition many believe the convention provides and wary of 
contributing to the further reification and persistence of the problem categories themselves. 
 8. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 8 (5th ed. 1904). 
 9. The Promised Land, in THE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER: DOCUMENTS, 
SPEECHES, AND FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS FROM THE BLACK FREEDOM STRUGGLE 383, 402 (Clayborne 
Carson et al. eds., 1991) (quoting Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.). 
 10. DU BOIS, supra note 8, at 12.  
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remark frequently invoked today by public health practitioners, Dr. 
King also emphasized the moral outrage attending health disparities: 
“Of all the forms of inequality, injustice in health is the most 
shocking and the most inhuman because it often results in physical 
death.”11 
The political and rhetorical currency of disparity discourse and 
disparity data in modern societies, committed in principle to equality, 
is apparent on its face. With increasing regularity over the course of 
the past two decades, commentary on racial disparities has become 
ubiquitous in political and academic debate. Social scientists, 
journalists, public health practitioners, legal scholars, and the 
political commentariat routinely use race as an independent variable 
to track and discuss disparate outcomes with respect to police 
violence, criminal sentencing, health (including COVID-19), 
housing, employment, wealth, and income, just to name a few 
contexts. Disparity discourse is one of the truth-telling modes of our 
era; it is the primary language through which we analyze the 
concepts of race and racism today. The ubiquity of disparity 
discourse is one of the basic premises of this intervention, and I am 
interested in exploring the consequences and potential trajectories of 
that phenomenon rather than demonstrating the accuracy of any 
particular empirical or descriptive disparity claims.  
For present purposes, it suffices to quote the pithy and tragic 
distillation of affairs from political scientists Rogers Smith and 
Desmond King: “The familiar, painful litany of the United States’ 
continuing and severe racial gaps in material well-being encompasses 
virtually every dimension of life, from economic well-being to health 
to housing to education to the criminal justice system.”12 As such, 
disparity discourse arises out of real material depredations, and to 
that extent, it is hardly surprising to see its proliferation in overtly 
 
 11. See Charlene Galarneau, Getting King’s Words Right, 29 J. HEALTH CARE POOR & 
UNDERSERVED 5, 5 (2018) (quoting Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.). 
 12. Rogers M. Smith & Desmond S. King, Barack Obama and the Future of American Racial 
Politics, 6 DU BOIS REV. 25, 26 (2009); see also MICHAEL C. DAWSON, NOT IN OUR LIFETIMES: THE 
FUTURE OF BLACK POLITICS 116 (2011). 
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political contexts as well as in ostensibly nonpolitical contexts like 
public health research centers. It recalls Theodor Adorno’s maxim: 
“Woe speaks: ‘Go.’”13 Disparity data calls to mind physical and 
psychological pain, which “tells our knowledge that suffering ought 
not to be, that things should be different.”14 But if woe speaks go, 
where, exactly, are we supposed to go? This is another formulation of 
the Symposium theme: after we acknowledge the woe, what’s next? 
What is the political vector on which racial disparity data sets our 
course? 
This Essay aims to clarify these questions by exploring some of 
the largely unmapped theoretical terrain underlying much disparity 
discourse. Part I introduces three recent political episodes that 
demonstrate how the rhetoric of racial disparity can be mobilized for 
an astonishingly wide range of political uses, impliedly underscoring 
the need to clarify some concepts and terms. The next two Parts 
undertake that project by situating racial disparity discourse in a 
theoretical context. First, Part II explains how most racial disparity 
discourse in the United States is predicated on a model of 
rationalistic discourse undertaken by coequal interlocutors with the 
shared expectation of reaching a consensus once the cognitive gap 
between the interlocutors is bridged through strategic rhetorical use 
of disparity data. Then, Part III draws from philosopher Charles Mills 
and sociologists Moon-Kie Jung and Pierre Bourdieu to argue that 
the basic discursive conditions for a dialogue of the sort envisioned 
by the discourse theorists are not present, owing to cognitive 
pathologies and epistemological shortcomings, handicapping the 
abilities of many Americans to engage in rationalistic discourse on 
matters related to race.  
Following that, in Parts IV, V, and VI, this Essay argues that 
antiracists interested in eliminating racial disparities should focus 
their efforts on using disparity data within a reinvigorated radical 
 
 13. THEODOR W. ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS 203 (E.B. Ashton trans., Continuum Publ’g 
1973) (1966). 
 14. Id. 
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Black politics, conceived along the lines of what political theorist 
Chantal Mouffe has called “agonistic pluralism.” Mouffe’s agonistic 
pluralism foregrounds conflict and conversion over conversations 
and convincing, and seeks to articulate an alternative political project 
dedicated to coalition building based on egalitarian principles.15 Such 
a radical Black politics is not meant as a passive, receptacle category 
collecting together the activities of all Black people engaged in 
radical politics at a given point in time. Instead, the category is meant 
to refer to an insurgent politics dedicated to organizing programs, 
associations, alliances, and legal reform efforts aiming to eradicate 
racialized hierarchies and disparities throughout the social formation, 
as well as challenging those parts of the political economy that 
reciprocally nurture and feed off those arbitrary hierarchies and 
differences. 
One further terminological clarification is in order here: 
throughout this Essay, I consider the pragmatic possibilities of 
discourse between Black and White Americans,16 and I will discuss 
certain potentials in radical Black politics. In doing so, I do not mean 
to ignore the multiple other racialized categories that have played, 
and continue to play, constitutive roles in U.S. politics and society. 
Instead, the predominant, but not exclusive, focus on the history, 
politics, and lived disparities of Black Americans is attributable to 
the special role that Black politics has played in U.S. history and the 
concomitant special power Black politics has to galvanize challenges 
to the established racial order.17 That said, I suspect that the 
 
 15. See infra Parts IV, V, VI. 
 16. This focus of this Essay is on race discourse in the United States, where race has played a 
constitutive role in developing notions of the polity, culture, and the broader social formation. As David 
Roediger puts it, whereas “[t]he world got along without race for the overwhelming majority of its 
history, the U.S. has never been without it.” DAVID R. ROEDIGER, HOW RACE SURVIVED U.S. HISTORY: 
FROM SETTLEMENT AND SLAVERY TO THE ECLIPSE OF POST-RACIALISM, at xii (2008) (cleaned up). 
Nevertheless, it is of course likely that, given the persistence of race thinking and racism in many 
regions of the world, some of the concepts and arguments presented in this Essay will apply in those 
other contexts as well.  
 17. Nikhil Singh’s observation that the ample Black radical tradition operates an immanent critique 
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theoretical framework explored here will have ready application in 
the context of other racialized groups as well. 
I. THE MUDDLED POLITICS OF THE MOMENT IN THREE EPISODES 
The problem is that disparity politics are, at present, hopelessly 
muddled. And muddled, disorganized politics complicate efforts to 
marshal information about racial disparities in service of focused 
efforts to achieve meaningful changes in material social conditions. 
Indeed, sometimes the people bringing up racial disparities are 
ideologically committed to maintaining those disparities. For an even 
larger group, the oceanic disparities themselves, provided they are 
deracialized, are not even cognizable as problems in and of 
themselves. Worse still, this latter group might make honest efforts to 
change the material conditions of oppressed people susceptible to 
co-optation by forces dedicated to preserving those same conditions. 
Stuart Hall evocatively described this process as the “stitching” of 
otherwise volatile and oppositional cultural practices and social 
movements into the dominant social formation.18 Amidst these 
muddled disparity politics, we need to focus our attention on the 
multiple trajectories on which concrete, material interests can project 
otherwise neutral social scientific information like racial disparity 
data.19 
In recent years, the multiple trajectories of the Black Lives Matter 
movement illustrate the flexible and protean discursive environment 
where disparity discourse thrives. In August of 2016, the Movement 
for Black Lives (M4BL), a coalition of over fifty organizations 
formed in response to outcry over racially disparate treatment by the 
police, published an ambitious policy platform entitled A Vision for 
Black Lives: Policy Demands for Black Power, Freedom, and 
 
 18. STUART HALL, CULTURAL STUDIES 1983: A THEORETICAL HISTORY 189 (Jennifer Daryl Slack 
& Lawrence Grossberg eds., 2016). 
 19. See Adolph Reed Jr., The Post-1965 Trajectory of Race, Class, and Urban Politics in the United 
States Reconsidered, 41 LAB. STUD. J. 260, 278 (2016). 
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Justice.20 That document sets forth aspirational goals relating to six 
arenas: (1) ending forms of state-sponsored racial violence against 
Black people; (2) reparations from state and nonstate institutions for 
racial subjugation; (3) divestment from institutions responsible for 
“criminalizing, caging, and harming” Black people, along with other 
exploitative forces such as prisons, fossil fuels, police, and 
surveillance; (4) “economic justice for all and a reconstruction of the 
economy”; (5) direct democratic “control [of] the laws, institutions, 
and policies that are meant to serve us—from our schools to our local 
budgets, economies, police departments, and our land”; and (6) a 
“remaking of the current U.S. political system in order to create a real 
democracy where Black people and all marginalized people can 
effectively exercise full political power.”21 Just to highlight a few of 
the more concrete proposals, the document calls for community 
control over institutions like the police and schools; participatory 
budgeting at the local, state, and federal levels; decommodification of 
housing; abolishment of capital punishment; permanent cessation of 
deportation; reworking the tax code to effectuate a “radical and 
sustainable redistribution of wealth”; institution of a universal basic 
income; breaking up large financial institutions; and public financing 
of elections.22 Robin Kelley might even understate matters when he 
describes the document as a “remarkable blueprint for social 
transformation.”23 It also echoes the Black Panther Party’s famous 
“Ten-Point Program.”24 It is a plan not just to end structural racism 
 
 20. See generally MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, A VISION FOR BLACK LIVES: POLICY DEMANDS 
FOR BLACK POWER, FREEDOM, AND JUSTICE (2016), https://cjc.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/A-
Vision-For-Black-Lives-Policy-Demands-For-Black-Power-Freedom-and-Justice.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5K8A-BDPB]. 
 21. Id. at 6–15. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Robin D.G. Kelley, What Does Black Lives Matter Want?, BOS. REV. (Aug. 17, 2016), 
http://bostonreview.net/books-ideas/robin-d-g-kelley-movement-black-lives-vision 
[https://perma.cc/3SJK-CHKS]. 
 24. For a description of the Ten-Point Program, see MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BLACKS IN AND OUT OF 
THE LEFT 137–40 (2013). 
11
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but also to save the planet and transform the entire nation along the 
way.25 
This past year, in the immediate aftermath of the convulsive street 
protests following the videotaped state lynching of George Floyd, 
Jamie Dimon (the head of JPMorgan Chase & Co., the nation’s 
largest bank) “took a knee” in a staged photograph with corporate 
staff.26 A few months later, the bank announced a $30 billion 
“Advancing Black Pathways” program that, the bank promised, 
would fund tens of thousands of home mortgage and small business 
loans for “Black, Latinx and minority” borrowers, finance 100,000 
affordable housing units, and mentor “thousands of Black 
students.”27 Never mind that the bank had recently settled a civil 
enforcement action in which the government alleged that the bank 
had discriminated against Black and Hispanic homeowners by 
charging them higher interest rates and loan fees than similarly 
situated White borrowers. Even more fundamentally, no one with 
even a glancing familiarity with JPMorgan and banks like it thinks 
that the net effect of the company’s real estate lending practices, over 
any time horizon, will amount to anything other than 
rent-intensifying redevelopment that displaces economically 
disadvantaged minority communities.28 And yet, all that 
 
 25. See Kelley, supra note 23. 
 26. Lananh Nguyen et al., Banks Snared in Race Conversation, Confronted by Bleak Legacy, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 16, 2020, 11:28 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-06-16/banks-snared-in-race-conversation-confronted-
by-bleak-legacy [https://perma.cc/6MFG-N5RK].  
 27. See Isabel Togoh, JP Morgan Pledges $30 Billion to Help Remedy Racial Wealth Gap, FORBES 
(Oct. 8, 2020, 5:53 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/isabeltogoh/2020/10/08/jp-morgan-pledges-30-
billion-to-help-remedy-racial-wealth-gap/?sh=5eb34105594d [https://perma.cc/CKJ7-AF5U]; 
Advancing Black Pathways, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/impact/people/advancing-black-pathways [https://perma.cc/AN2X-
QMFF].  
 28. See, e.g., CAL. REINVESTMENT COALITION, ANTI-DISPLACEMENT CODE OF CONDUCT: HOW 
BANKS, PRIVATE EQUITY AND WALL STREET CAN STOP CONTRIBUTING TO DISPLACEMENT (2018), 
https://cceda.com/wp-content/uploads/Anti-displacement-best-practices-10.16.18.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7AMP-VQV2] (linking the role of bank finance to eviction, displacement, and 
homelessness); THE GREENLINING INST., ECONOMIC EQUITY: THE STATE OF GENTRIFICATION: 
HOME-LENDING TO COMMUNITIES OF COLOR IN CALIFORNIA 3 (2017), http://greenlining.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/State-of-Gentrification-Home-Lending-to-Communities-of-Color-in-
California.pdf [https://perma.cc/QXZ9-VXW7] (documenting how large banks originate home loans in 
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notwithstanding, the bank was compelled to issue the following 
ceremonial proclamation to accompany the announcement: 
“Systemic racism is a tragic part of America’s history. We can do 
more and do better to break down systems that have propagated 
racism and widespread economic inequality, especially for Black and 
Latinx people. It’s long past time that society addresses racial 
inequities in a more tangible, meaningful way.”29 
Three days after Dimon took a knee, prominent members of the 
Democratic Party like Nancy Pelosi, Chuck Schumer, and Steny 
Hoyer did the same—while wearing Kente cloth!—in an attempt to 
demonstrate their solidarity with the Black Lives Matter protests.30 
Juxtaposed with the Dimon performance, the staged photo op can 
only be described as a “hold my beer” moment—one that was equal 
parts disorienting, comical, and offensive. These same politicians had 
established track records that flagrantly contradicted every item in 
the M4BL vision—track records that were not merely historical 
artifacts, but present realities on which they had recently doubled 
down.31 
So how are we to interpret these seemingly incongruent moments? 
In reality, the incongruities are much more pervasive than even these 
episodes suggest. Nevertheless, at a minimum, they highlight the 
flexibility of both the basic Black Lives Matter message and the 
perception of racially disparate treatment that gives it life.  
The same could be said about racial disparity discourse; its 
capaciousness provides it with its potential power, but also its 
susceptibility to co-optation and rudderless ineffectuality. Obviously, 
 
low- to moderate-income census tracts at rates that vastly exceed the rates at which they lend to low- to 
moderate-income borrowers). 
 29. Our Path Forward, JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., https://www.jpmorganchase.com/impact/path-
forward [https://perma.cc/2BHK-FYDM] (quoting JPMorgan Chase & Co. Chairman and CEO, Jamie 
Dimon). 
 30. Doreen St. Félix, The Embarrassment of Democrats Wearing Kente-Cloth Stoles, THE NEW 
YORKER (June 9, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/on-and-off-the-avenue/the-
embarrassment-of-democrats-wearing-kente-cloth-stoles [https://perma.cc/8MLA-QZAF].  
 31. See David Dayen, Nancy Pelosi Rams Austerity Provision into House Rules Package over 
Objections of Progressives, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 2, 2019, 10:43 AM), 
https://theintercept.com/2019/01/02/nancy-pelosi-pay-go-rule/ [https://perma.cc/M6AP-U8FC].  
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we must acknowledge as a first principle that no effective political 
movement can include people committed to decommodified housing 
alongside JPMorgan commercial real estate lenders, or people 
committed to prison abolition and forcible break-ups of financial 
institutions alongside the politicians that have shepherded the 
Democratic leadership through its neoliberal transmogrification,32 
during which the party has replaced its commitment to social 
provision with marketization principles and hyper-incarceration.33 If 
we are going to have honest conversations about racial disparities in 
the United States, we need to know what we are talking about and 
why we are doing so, and these juxtaposed images demonstrate that 
we all too frequently fail both these tests. It will not suffice to scratch 
our heads in bewilderment; these episodes are significant signposts 
on the terrain on which politics is being conducted today. 
To some extent, this confusion and mixed messaging is 
unsurprising. After all, only one-half of one branch of our national 
government has ever apologized for slavery.34 And no branch of our 
government has ever apologized for the genocide of indigenous 
Americans. No reparations have been paid to descendants of either 
group; no truth and reconciliation commissions have been established 
to reckon with the legacies of either historical reality. A full quarter 
of the country’s landmass is littered with statues and memorials 
glorifying political and military leaders that would not be there were 
 
 32. See generally Adolph Reed Jr., Nothing Left: The Long, Slow Surrender of American Liberals, 
HARPER’S MAG. (Mar. 2014), https://harpers.org/archive/2014/03/nothing-left-2/ 
[https://perma.cc/W494-KUEL]. 
 33. “Hyper-incarceration” is a term introduced by sociologist Loïc Wacquant to refer to the carceral 
state, unprecedented in human history, that has emerged in the United States over the past several 
decades, often with explicit cooperation from the Kente-robed legislators demonstrating solidarity with 
anti-police violence protesters. See Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race and Hyperincarceration in Revanchist 
America, 139 DÆDALUS 74, 78 (2010); LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL 
GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 99–100, 304 (Duke Univ. Press 2009) (2004) [hereinafter 
WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR]; Loïc Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet 
and Match, 3 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 95, 118 (2001) [hereinafter Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis] (“[T]he 
penal tutelage of African Americans has escalated to heights experienced by no other group in history, 
even under the most repressive authoritarian regimes and in Soviet-style societies.”). 
 34. Congress Apologizes for Slavery, Jim Crow, NPR (July 30, 2008, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93059465 [https://perma.cc/67JM-T4FF]. 
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it not for the fact that they were defending the institution of slavery. 
Antiracist politics are, as always, facing headwinds in the United 
States; the only question is whether those headwinds buffet so 
strongly that the only sensible course of action is to redirect around 
them and re-strategize the way we think about this problem 
altogether. 
The discussion that follows below surveys some of the theoretical 
terrain underlying the episodes highlighted here, along with countless 
other similar episodes. Social theory provides a roadmap for our 
social environment, and the aim here is to use theory to elucidate 
some of the very real practical consequences of disparity discourse 
on contemporary social and political life. 
II. MAINSTREAM RACIAL DISPARITY DISCOURSE AS A 
HABERMASIAN PROJECT 
Imagine a hypothetical colloquy in which an antiracist approaches 
an acquaintance otherwise disinclined to antiracist politics, 
burnishing disparity data amply demonstrating the gulf between the 
material and psychic experiences of White Americans and Black 
Americans. Let us assume that the antiracist’s interlocutor is open in 
principle to being convinced about the need to remedy the disparate 
and inferior experiences and realities of nonwhite fellow citizens. 
The antiracist hopes to open the interlocutor’s eyes to the history and 
enduring legacy of racism in the United States and to thereby 
catalyze a new commitment on their part to an antiracist politics 
seeking to enfold Black Americans into the social formation as full 
social equals.35 The problem, we will see, is that the pragmatic 
conditions of possibility for a colloquy of this sort are far more 
complicated than many antiracists acknowledge.  
 
 35. Note that the more frequent formulation of this idea—refracted through the ideologically 
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The basic discursive conditions of a colloquy like this are premised 
on the notion that the problem is one of knowledge36—that if our 
fellow citizen-listeners only learn more, they will agree with us. The 
colloquy is predicated, then, on a cognitive gap between the antiracist 
and the interlocutor. This cognitive gap can consist of both moral 
arguments concerning, for example, what a just society requires, as 
well as factual–historical arguments concerning, for example, the 
extent or cause of the empirical disparity.37 Good liberals and 
deliberative democrats will hope that a thorough ventilation of the 
arguments on, say, the increased mortality risk that pregnant Black 
women face, will eventually produce a rough agreement as to the real 
qualities of the phenomenon—its statistical manifestation, the causal 
environment out of which it arises, its arbitrariness and unfairness, 
and so forth. They might even hope to reach an agreement on how 
this health disparity problem might be solved. 
At bottom, conversations like the colloquy hypothesized here are 
grounded in a model of rationalist, agreement-seeking discourse 
according to which free and equal participants submit their facts and 
arguments to the test of shared validity criteria. In this sort of 
encounter, the predicate relations among the interlocutors are 
arranged, as Seyla Benhabib describes it, so that “what is considered 
in the common interest of all . . . results from processes 
of . . . deliberation conducted rationally and fairly among free and 
 
 36. The same could be said about coverage of racial disparities that have figured prominently in 
cable and print news media in recent years. 
 37. Moral argumentation in the context of racial disparities can take many forms. Philosopher Chris 
Lebron provides one example of moral argumentation in this context when he explains the cleavage 
between the “two realities” of Black Americans and many non-antiracist Americans—for instance, the 
deeply held belief by many in the latter category that the Civil Rights era established a permanent 
equality—not as “a matter of error, but of will.” Chris Lebron, Race, Truth, and Our Two Realities, 
N.Y. TIMES: THE STONE (July 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/11/opinion/race-truth-and-
our-two-realities.html [https://perma.cc/3AU6-MC5E]. According to this line of argument, if White 
Americans only possessed greater moral fortitude, discursive agreement would (eventually) follow. 
Even though the emphasis is moral rather than empirical, this type of account is predicated on discursive 
rationality and diverges sharply from the account presented by Mills and Jung below. See WILLIAM 
OUTHWAITE, HABERMAS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 44 (2009) (noting how Habermas believed that 
both empirical and ethical judgments could be validated by discursive practices rationally oriented to 
consensus). 
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equal individuals.”38 The aim of this type of discourse is to generate a 
rationally motivated consensus on controversial claims through the 
“force of the better argument” alone.39 In our hypothetical setting of a 
discussion on racial disparities, the endgame is achieving some sort 
of transracial coalition of the discursively convinced.  
Jürgen Habermas, the primary theorist of this type of 
rational-discursive grounding of social action, posits four pragmatic 
presuppositions for discourse: publicity and inclusiveness, equal 
rights to engage in communication, exclusion of deception and 
illusion, and the absence of coercion.40 Further, Habermas posits that 
this type of rational discourse is underwritten by a “lifeworld” that 
appears as a “reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of unshaken 
convictions that participants in communication draw upon in 
cooperative processes of interpretation.”41 The lifeworld is the 
“background horizon of unthematized assumptions, implicit 
expectations, and individual know-how within which communicative 
action unfolds.”42 The lifeworld and communicative action are 
reciprocally constitutive; that is, the lifeworld enables 
communication, while the communication itself ensures continuation 
of the lifeworld.43 In the public realm of politics, the possibility or 
expectation of discursive agreement on contentious matters of public 
concern then stabilizes the institutional arrangements of 
liberal-democratic societies.44  
These concepts of discourse and lifeworld are crucial in 
Habermasian social theory. Modern societies, no longer able to 
 
 38. Seyla Benhabib, Deliberative Democracy and Models of Democratic Legitimacy, 1 
CONSTELLATIONS 26, 30–31 (1994). 
 39. SEYLA BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF CRITICAL 
THEORY 284, 286 (1986); see also THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE CRITICAL THEORY OF JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS 303 (1978). 
 40. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN NATURALISM AND RELIGION: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 49–
50 (Ciaran Cronin trans., 2008). 
 41. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 2 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: SYSTEM AND LIFEWORLD 
AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 124 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987). 
 42. BENHABIB, supra note 39, at 239. 
 43. See id. at 125; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A 
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 22 (William Rehg trans., 1996). 
 44. See CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 94 (2000). 
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anchor social integration with religious and traditional lifeworld 
certainties, rely instead on this discursive, consensus-oriented 
communicative action to integrate social groups and socialize 
individuals.45 A solidarity emerges not as the result of traditional 
lifeworld relationships stitching together an ethnocentrically and 
geographically isolated collectivity, but as a result of the “realization 
that each person must take responsibility for the other because as 
consociates all must have an interest in the integrity of their shared 
life context in the same way.”46 In using the terms integration and 
solidarity, Habermas refers to the core problem of order, a 
preoccupation of all classical and contemporary social theory.47 But 
in the context of American racism, history, and politics, the 
integration concept has an obvious double valence inasmuch as 
(1) social order has always been defined in racial terms and (2) actual 
integration of (and solidarity between) the races has always 
threatened established social order. 
This dissonant chord played alongside two concepts otherwise 
denoting harmony clues us in to a real problem with reliance on 
discursive rationality to address race in the United States. Michael 
Dawson has documented the wide gulf separating Black and White 
public opinion in the United States, and he argues that the divide 
testifies to completely different normative and interpretive ways of 
seeing and experiencing the world.48  
Writing two decades ago, well before the era of the Tea Party and 
Trump,49 political scientists Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders 
 
 45. See HABERMAS, supra note 41, at 63. 
 46. Jürgen Habermas, Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning “Stage 6,” 21 PHIL. F. 
32, 47 (1989); see also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 
200 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990) (locating the source of morality in the 
mutually constitutive concepts of justice and solidarity, with the latter referring to “the well-being of 
associated members of a community who inter-subjectively share the same lifeworld”). 
 47. For two of the classics, see C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 44 (2000); and 
TALCOTT PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 377 (1937). 
 48. See generally DAWSON, supra note 12. 
 49. The two shorthand references here are intended to refer to a broad trend in U.S. public discourse 
over the past two decades that is characterized by, if anything, racialized concepts assuming a greater 
salience. See WENDY BROWN, IN THE RUINS OF NEOLIBERALISM: THE RISE OF ANTIDEMOCRATIC 
POLITICS IN THE WEST 5–7 (2019). Wendy Brown evocatively describes the “ferocious antidemocratic 
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warned that their research on public opinions suggested that 
communal dialogue and consensus-formation was unlikely to move 
the needle on matters related to race: 
[T]he most striking feature of [American] public opinion on 
race is how emphatically black and white Americans 
disagree with each other. . . . Many contemporary theorists 
of democracy urge communal dialogues designed to 
uncover or create consensus among Americans on matters 
of public concern. Racial matters obviously qualify as 
pressing public concerns, but the evidence presented here 
of a deep and perhaps widening racial divide makes the 
discovery of commonality and agreement between the races 
a dim prospect. When it comes to questions of race policy 
in the United States, this particular vision of contemporary 
democratic theorists looks to be more a distant aspiration 
than a realistic immediate goal.50 
Dawson himself wonders if this dynamic might mean that Black 
and White Americans, presently as always, lack a shared lifeworld 
that can serve as a basis for mutual understanding.51 Without a 
lifeworld of shared background assumptions that the antiracist and 
the interlocutor from our earlier hypothetical can take for granted, 
how can they engage in the type of discussion we imagine them 
undertaking? 
What if Dawson is correct? What if the cognitive gap when it 
comes to the empirics and ethics of racial disparity is not bridgeable, 
as the discourse theorists assume it is? More specifically, what if 
many White Americans only have recourse to an “epistemology of 
 
forces in the second decade of the twenty-first century” as fueled by an “attack on equality, combined 
with mobilization of traditional values, . . . [which] turn[ed] up the heat on and legitimate[d] 
long-simmering racisms from colonial and slave legacies . . . .” Id. at 7. 
 50. DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND 
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 33 (1996) (emphasis added). 
 51. See DAWSON, supra note 12, at 5. 
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ignorance”52 that prevents them from transforming the disparity data 
into changed political and moral beliefs? What if these 
cognitive-epistemological shortcomings deprive them of shared 
lifeworld presuppositions requisite for discursive agreement, 
diminishing, or even eliminating, their ability to recognize “the force 
of the better argument”53 when it comes to the enduring legacy of 
race thinking in the United States? What if, instead of interpreting 
disparity data in a manner that facilitates the formation of an 
enlightened transracial coalition of the discursively convinced, they 
interpret the disparities as empirical confirmation of their own 
preconceptions of naturalized racial hierarchies?54  
Consider the harrowing statistic that one in three newborn Black 
boys in the United States today should expect to go to prison in his 
lifetime.55 Of course, some will interpret that statistic as evidence that 
a hyperactive and hypertrophic carceral apparatus has become 
unmoored from human reason and as a call to rethink that system and 
much of the broader political economy root and branch.56 Still, others 
might rationalize statistics like this as confirmation of their beliefs, 
whether conscious or unconscious, that Black American males are 
prone to criminality and violence, or are the unavoidable casualties of 
trenchant “underclass” pathologies traceable to federal welfare policy 
or poor decision-making by their forbears, or are more able to handle 
the physical and psychic toll of imprisonment, or are simply less able 
 
 52. See CHARLES W. MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS: THE CRITIQUE OF RACIAL 
LIBERALISM 71 (2018) [hereinafter MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS]; CHARLES W. MILLS, THE 
RACIAL CONTRACT 93 (1997) [hereinafter MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT]. 
 53. BENHABIB, supra note 39, at 286. 
 54. See Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Racial Disparities in Incarceration Increase 
Acceptance of Punitive Policies, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 1949, 1949 (2014) (presenting survey research 
demonstrating that “[e]xposure to extreme racial disparities . . . can lead people to support the very 
policies that produce those disparities, thus perpetuating a vicious cycle”). 
 55. THE SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL 
RAPPORTEUR ON CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA, AND 
RELATED INTOLERANCE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 1 (2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/ 
[https://perma.cc/BF6G-65PW]. 
 56. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing the historically unprecedented vastness of 
the contemporary U.S. carceral system).  
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to elicit a sympathetic response when compared to their own relatives 
or the kids in their (still segregated)57 neighborhoods. The disparity 
might also be rationalized by conscious or unconscious anxieties 
about the political demands that currently incarcerated people might 
be expected to make if they were liberated or not imprisoned in the 
first place, and the potential ramifications of those demands on their 
own investments in presently existing social institutions. Ultimately, 
the prevalence of these attitudes is an empirical question, albeit one 
that is difficult to assess. Still, the evident failure of existing 
institutions to redress the issue,58 notwithstanding its flagrant 
contradiction of the professed political and moral commitments of 
the polity, suggests that we should, at least provisionally, lower our 
expectations of discovering a lifeworld consensus on matters of race 
in the United States. 
If so, then we should also expect, as Kinder and Sanders have 
suggested, that most rationalist discourse aimed at transforming 
White racial beliefs will fall flat. The conditions of possibility for the 
hypothetical colloquy are far too distant from the idealized situations 
envisioned by the theorists of discursive, communicative 
rationality.59 To be clear, the argument is not that conversations about 
race between friends, family, and colleagues might never budge the 
needle on racism at the individual level. Most of us have ample 
personal experience with that sort of dialogue, and we are much the 
better for it. Instead, the argument is that attempting to ground an 
 
 57. See Jenny Schuetz, Metro Areas Are Still Racially Segregated, BROOKINGS: THE AVE. (Dec. 8, 
2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/12/08/metro-areas-are-still-racially-segregated/ 
[https://perma.cc/AN6Y-ZPKN]. 
 58. As of July 2021, during a period of historically unprecedented attention on documented police 
brutality, the signature piece of national legislation offering a (modest) curtailment of the hyper-carceral 
state, the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, is mired in gridlock. See Sarah D. Wire, George Floyd’s 
Death Sparked Calls for Police Reform. Why Hasn’t Congress Acted?, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2021), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-04-20/whatever-happened-to-police-reform-legislation 
[https://perma.cc/L97B-9VRH]. Meanwhile, large states with significant Black populations have 
legislated decisively to prevent even putting police budgets meaningfully in discussion. See, e.g., Mark 
Niesse, Kemp Signs Ban on Defunding Police, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 10, 2021, at 1B.  
 59. See supra text accompanying note 40. In Habermasian terms, the “pragmatic presuppositions” of 
discourse are not present, especially the condition that there is no deception or illusion on the part of 
participants. See supra text accompanying note 40. 
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effective antiracist and anti-disparitarian politics on rational 
discourse with White Americans might very well be a fool’s errand. 
Worse still, if the deliberative and discursive model of politics is 
likely to stall out when it comes to matters of race in the United 
States, then insisting on that sort of politics, and therefore holding 
forth the expectation that some transracial consensus should be 
achievable, might undermine political programs seeking to eliminate 
racial disparities that are predicated on other foundations. The 
expectation of a possible agreement among interlocutors sharing the 
same lifeworld shifts blame for failure to agree onto the individual 
interlocutors’ behavioral and attitudinal attributes, directing attention 
away from the structural features of the culture and the political 
economy, including their power dynamics and historical trajectories, 
that are responsible for having produced the disparities in the first 
place.60 The humming presses churning out copies of the latest titles 
in the new cottage industry of how-to-talk-about-race guidebooks—
White Fragility: Why It’s So Hard for White People to Talk About 
Racism;61 How to Argue with a Racist;62 Let’s Talk Race: A Guide 
for White People;63 So You Want to Talk About Race;64 Why I’m No 
Longer Talking to White People About Race65—testify to the 
contemporary salience of the discursive frame and the potential threat 
it poses. By continuing to invest in therapeutic interventions designed 
to combat individual prejudice for the sake of improved discursive 
understanding, we risk ignoring Frantz Fanon’s sage counsel to 
 
 60. See WENDY BROWN, REGULATING AVERSION: TOLERANCE IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY AND 
EMPIRE 142–43 (2006). 
 61. See generally ROBIN DIANGELO, WHITE FRAGILITY: WHY IT’S SO HARD FOR WHITE PEOPLE TO 
TALK ABOUT RACISM (2018). 
 62. See generally ADAM RUTHERFORD, HOW TO ARGUE WITH A RACIST: WHAT OUR GENES DO 
(AND DON’T) SAY ABOUT HUMAN DIFFERENCE (2020). 
 63. See generally FERN L. JOHNSON & MARLENE G. FINE, LET’S TALK RACE: A GUIDE FOR WHITE 
PEOPLE (2021). 
 64. See generally IJEOMA OLUO, SO YOU WANT TO TALK ABOUT RACE (2018). 
 65. See generally RENI EDDO-LODGE, WHY I’M NO LONGER TALKING TO WHITE PEOPLE ABOUT 
RACE (2017). 
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abandon “[t]he habit of considering racism as a mental quirk, as a 
psychological flaw.”66  
Individualizing and psychologizing the problem in this manner 
operates as an ideological conceit.67 It depoliticizes racial disparities 
and racism,68 dissipating political energy into therapeutic endeavors 
to awaken (as in, make “woke”) individual people at the expense of 
developing radical politics up to the task of countervailing the 
political, economic, and cultural hierarchies responsible for 
reproducing the disparities.69 Of course, racialized hierarchies 
manifest themselves in individual psyches, but the important point is 
that the discourse frame tends to reduce racialized hierarchies to an 
emergent, aggregate result of deviant, prejudicial psyches, rather than 
appreciating their antecedent influence on those individual psyches. 
Thus, insistence on discourse, where the pragmatic preconditions 
for discourse are not present, impedes efforts to investigate the 
causes underlying problems while participants prattle past each other, 
more likely bandying ideological tropes rather than progressing to 
consensus. (Readers who use social media will appreciate this point 
immediately). In short, looking to discourse to dissolve racial 
divisions and disparities might not only be pointless, but pernicious 
too.  
As discussed in greater detail below in Part V, looking to discourse 
to dissolve racial divisions and disparities undermines its putative 
 
 66. FRANTZ FANON, TOWARD THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION 38 (Haakon Chevalier trans., 1967). 
 67. See Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and 
the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92, 100 (2004). See generally LEAH N. GORDON, 
FROM POWER TO PREJUDICE: THE RISE OF RACIAL INDIVIDUALISM IN MIDCENTURY AMERICA (2015) 
(describing ideological thematization of racism as an individual psychological problem).  
 68. See BROWN, supra note 60, at 15–16 (discussing ideological and depoliticizing effects of treating 
social structures as personal psychological matters). 
 69. The discourse frame sheds light on a dialectical contradiction implicit in the predominant liberal 
conceptualization of racism: most liberal antiracists insist on the ubiquity of racism, on its status as a 
mass, systemic social phenomenon, all the while they urge the application of a remedy at the individual 
psychological, rather than the systemic (i.e., cultural and political–economic), level. The point is hardly 
that individuals lack agency to change their attitudes and even improve society. Nevertheless, a 
predominantly therapeutic, didactic, psychologizing approach neutralizes the political energy required to 
harness those agencies to reform or re-form the political culture and economy so that it stops 
reproducing racialized hierarchies and disparities in the first place. 
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objectives in two further ways. First, it distracts from other efforts to 
build solidaristic political constituencies capable of mounting a 
credible threat to the established racialized order.70 Second, it 
arguably entrenches that same established order (and the disparities it 
reproduces) insofar as it offers opportunities for bank executives, 
tech tycoons, and politicians to co-opt otherwise oppositional 
energies by presenting the disparities as a social problem to be 
resolved within the established order.71 In this way, otherwise radical 
and oppositional potentials within the citizenry are incorporated or 
“stitched into”72 the dominant, established social formation.73 In fact, 
thinking of co-optation in this manner helps clarify the otherwise 
confounding, head-scratching images of bankers and politicians 
“taking a knee.” Together, these factors produce the paradoxical 
result that reliance on discourse to redress racism ends up bolstering 
the legitimacy of the established order against which antiracists are 
struggling.  
III. A PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATION AND A SOCIOLOGICAL 
EXPLANATION FOR THE PRESENT IMPRACTICALITY OF AN EFFECTIVE 
ANTI-DISPARITARIAN POLITICS GROUNDED IN DISCOURSE 
Despite the hopes of those who would like to use discourse and 
communicative rationality to achieve progressive consensus on 
racism in the United States, using disparity data as part of a project to 
eliminate those disparities and promote a more egalitarian society 
should not be conceptualized predominantly, or perhaps even at all, 
as an attempt to convince White Americans of anything. The 
argument here draws heavily from the philosopher Charles Mills and 
the sociologist Moon-Kie Jung to explain why Habermasian 
 
 70. See infra Part V. 
 71. See MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 120–21. 
 72. See supra text accompanying note 18 (discussing Stuart Hall’s similar “stitching” metaphor). 
 73. See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, CULTURE AND MATERIALISM: SELECTED ESSAYS 42–51 (1980) 
(theorizing hegemony as the “incorporation” of adversarial and oppositional practices into the effective 
dominant culture). 
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discourse is likely to fail in that project. Specifically, this Part argues 
that widespread epistemological shortcomings and cognitive 
pathologies will inhibit efforts by antiracists to change the dominant 
conceptions of race and racism prevalent among White Americans. 
Implicitly, Mills and Jung deconstruct the prospect of rationalistic 
consensus on these matters and also warn us of potential unintended 
negative consequences of continuing to pursue political projects 
premised on that model of interaction.  
Mills uses the concept of what he calls the “racial contract” to 
resituate Rawlsian “social contract” theory from the realm of ideal 
theory (e.g., the famous “veil of ignorance”)74 back to the historical 
conditions for its possibility—conditions that are saturated 
throughout with racial hierarchies. Because we live in a political 
world that is grounded, both historically and presently, in racial 
subordination and hierarchy, Mills argues: 
Racism and racially structured discrimination have not 
been deviations from the norm; they have been the norm, 
not merely in the sense of de facto statistical distribution 
patterns, but . . . in the sense of being formally codified, 
written down and proclaimed as such. From this 
perspective, the Racial Contract has underwritten the social 
contract, so that duties, rights, and liberties have routinely 
been assigned on a racially differentiated basis. To 
understand the actual moral practice of past and present, 
one needs not merely the standard abstract discussions of, 
say, the conflicts in people’s consciences between 
self-interest and empathy with others but a frank 
appreciation of how the Racial Contract creates a 
racialized moral psychology. Whites will then act in racist 
ways while thinking of themselves as acting morally. In 
other words, they will experience genuine cognitive 
difficulties in recognizing certain behavior patterns as 
 
 74. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 142–43 (1971). 
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racist, so that quite apart from questions of motivation and 
bad faith they will be morally handicapped simply from the 
conceptual point of view in seeing and doing the right 
thing.75 
To open White interlocutors’ eyes requires not only that they admit 
the ugly truth of the past and present but also that they “understand[] 
the ways in which these realities were made invisible, acceptable to 
the white population.”76 As a result:  
[O]n matters related to race, the Racial Contract prescribes 
for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an 
epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized 
and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are 
psychologically and socially functional), producing the 
ironic outcome that whites will in general be unable to 
understand the world they themselves have made.77 
Some other perceptive theorists of race describe racism in similar 
terms. Stuart Hall, for instance, links racism to the unconscious 
conditions for cognition, arguing that it begins as a “profound 
historical forgetfulness . . . the loss of historical memory, a kind of 
historical amnesia, a decisive mental repression.”78 Michael Rogin’s 
concept of “political amnesia,” by which he refers to a kind of 
“motivated disavowal” or “motivated forgetting” in which “that 
which is insistently represented becomes, by being normalized to 
invisibility, absent and disappeared,” describes the same psychic, and 
thereby cognitive, phenomenon.79 It disconnects current practices 
from historical roots and prepares political subjects (like our 
 
 75. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52 (emphasis added). 
 76. Id. at 92. 
 77. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
 78. STUART HALL, SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS: THE GREAT MOVING RIGHT SHOW AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 145 (2017). 
 79. Michael Rogin, “Make My Day!”: Spectacle As Amnesia in Imperial Politics, 29 
REPRESENTATIONS 99, 103–05 (1990). 
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hypothetical interlocutors) for integration within the established 
social formation. As with Mills’s racial contract, political amnesia 
comprises a “cultural structure” that implicates everyone to some 
extent, “from those who want others to forget; to those who forgot; to 
those who, with varying degrees of willfulness, never allowed 
themselves to know.”80 In this text, Rogin explores the 
psychoanalytic dimensions of this phenomenon, noting how spectacle 
in particular facilitates political amnesia by replacing historical 
memory and enabling a harmless and passive release of the (only 
barely) repressed confrontation with racial domination and violence 
that has always pervaded American society.81 
The farcical spectacles of the current neo-McCarthyite rush of 
governmental officials to sanitize the historical record of U.S. racism 
in schools and the public imagination,82 or of municipal officials 
incanting about the important “heritage” that confederate monuments 
represent,83 are noteworthy only for their clumsiness, not their 
aberrance, as examples of this widespread and entrenched American 
commitment to historical amnesia. 
But our hypothetical consensus-oriented antiracist advocate might 
insist that the recovery of these historical memories is the entire point 
of the colloquy. After all, disparity data might have the potential to 
change the minds of the hypothetical interlocutors who, it is 
presumed, have full agency and capacity to do so. (Recall that we 
 
 80. Id. at 105. 
 81. Id. at 106–07. 
 82. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY 1776 COMM’N, THE 1776 REPORT 15, 31 (2021), 
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-Presidents-Advisory-1776-
Commission-Final-Report.pdf (asserting that “America’s nearly two-century effort to realize fully the 
principles of the Declaration [of Independence] had reached a culmination” in 1963 before the 
corrupting influence of “group rights” movements beginning in the late 1960s); Exec. Order No. 13,950, 
85 Fed. Reg. 60,683 (Sept. 22, 2020) (decrying “destructive ideology . . . grounded in 
misrepresentations of our country’s history,” banning instruction of “divisive concepts” by federal 
agencies and contractors, and encouraging federal agencies to restrict research funding where funds will 
“promote divisive concepts”); H.B. 3979, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (enacted legislation banning 
any state school instruction exploring that “slavery and racism are anything other than deviations from, 
betrayals of, or failures to live up to, the authentic founding principles of the United States”). 
 83. See, e.g., Donnell Suggs, Heritage or Racism? Confederate Monument’s Fate Divides 
Brunswick, GPB NEWS, https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/10/24/heritage-or-racism-confederate-
monuments-fate-divides-brunswick [https://perma.cc/XNN7-U7XG] (Oct. 25, 2020, 9:50 AM).  
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assumed earlier that they conceive of themselves as open in principle 
to being convinced about the need to remedy the gap between the 
ideal of equality and the disparate empirical realities). However, 
Mills invites us to consider the unconscious beliefs that operate at 
deeper cognitive levels.84 He argues that the centrality of racial 
exploitation to the U.S. economy and the scale of the dimensions of 
the benefits accruing to White Americans render the topic of White 
racism “taboo, virtually undiscussed in the debates on justice of most 
white political theory.”85 “If there is such a backlash against 
affirmative action,” he wonders, “what would the response be to the 
demand for the interest on the unpaid forty acres and a mule?”86 The 
taboo conditioning disavowal of memory is reinforced ideologically 
through concepts such as “color-blindness” and “post-raciality.”87  
The immediate object of his critique here is White-dominated 
political philosophy, but as noted earlier, the argument is also 
epistemological: “the concept is driving the perception, with whites 
aprioristically intent on denying what is before them.”88 He writes 
further: 
[W]hatever one’s larger meta-theoretical sympathies, 
whatever approach one thinks best for investigating these 
ideational matters, such concerns obviously need to be part 
of a social epistemology. . . . [I]n certain areas this 
conceptual apparatus is likely going to be negatively 
shaped and inflected in various ways by the biases of the 
ruling group(s). . . . Moreover, what cognitive psychology 
has revealed is that rather than continually challenging 
conceptual adequacy by the test of disconfirming empirical 
data, we tend to do the opposite—to interpret the data 
through the grid of the concepts in such a way that 
 
 84. See MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52, at 93–95. 
 85. Id. at 39. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS, supra note 52, at 63–64. 
 88. Id. at 63 (emphasis omitted). 
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seemingly disconfirming, or at least problematic, 
perceptions are filtered out or marginalized. In other words, 
one will tend to find the confirmation in the world whether 
it is there or not.89 
Mills here draws our attention to research in cognitive psychology 
revealing the limited potential of disconfirming information to alter 
preconceptions,90 but he also implicitly raises the more disturbing 
possibility that these hardwired cognitive limitations might 
crystallize into ontological facts—that is, they might become 
inscribed into the very social being for many Americans. 
Importantly, Mills is careful to specify that what he calls “white 
ignorance” is a tendential phenomenon, not a categorical one. He 
“locates white miscognition as a structural phenomenon rather than a 
matter of individual white myopias”; it is “the result (not 
unavoidably, but as a strong psychological tendency) of racial 
location” that causes “whites [to] tend to get certain kinds of things 
wrong.”91 Furthermore, he clarifies that he is not suggesting that all 
White Americans operate in this epistemological fog, or for that 
matter that non-White Americans cannot also suffer from White 
ignorance.92 As he uses it, the “White” descriptor captures the term’s 
hierarchical salience in racialized societies and does not purport to 
describe the cognitive or psychological attributes of any particular 
individuals within those societies. 
Mills is an analytic political philosopher, and his critique of racial 
amnesia and White ignorance marshals concepts from that tradition, 
such as the social contract, epistemology, cognition, and ontology. In 
his 2015 book, Beneath the Surface of White Supremacy: 
Denaturalizing U.S. Racisms Past and Present, Moon-Kie Jung 
 
 89. Id. at 60–61. 
 90. See, e.g., Lee Clarke, The Disqualification Heuristic: When Do Organizations Misperceive 
Risk?, 5 RSCH. SOC. PROBS. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 289 (1993). 
 91. MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS, supra note 52, at xvii (emphasis added). 
 92. See id. at 57 (“[T]he ‘white’ in ‘white ignorance’ does not mean that it has to be confined to 
white people. . . . Providing the causal route is appropriate, blacks can manifest white ignorance also.”). 
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makes a similarly significant contribution to the literature on the 
mnemonic effects of race ideology in the United States, but from the 
sociological rather than a philosophical perspective. In particular, 
Jung draws from the work of sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and 
William Sewell.93  
Jung argues that race and racism in America should be thought of 
in terms of Sewell’s notion of “social structures.”94 For Sewell, social 
structures refer to combinations of social schema and social 
resources. Schemas refer to the binary oppositions that make up a 
society’s conceptual tools, along with the “various conventions, 
recipes, scenarios, principles of action, and habits of speech and 
gesture built up with these fundamental tools.”95 Resources, on the 
other hand, are the sources, material and immaterial, that “can be 
used to enhance or maintain power.”96 Though to widely varying 
degrees, structures tend to reproduce themselves because “resources 
are the effect of schemas, and schemas are the effects of resources. 
That is, schemas and resources are mutually sustaining.”97 In 
Sewell’s formulation, social structures vary along two different 
dimensions: depth and power.98 Most relevant for our purposes here 
is the notion of “deep structures,”99 which refer to “schemas that can 
be shown to underlie ordinary or ‘surface’ structures, in the sense that 
the surface structures are a set of transformations of the deep 
 
 93. See generally MOON-KIE JUNG, BENEATH THE SURFACE OF WHITE SUPREMACY: 
DENATURALIZING U.S. RACISMS PAST AND PRESENT (2015). 
 94. Id. Of course, the concept of structure is one of the key concepts of modern social theory, from 
Marx to Bourdieu and Giddens. The point here is not that Sewell and Jung have invented a new 
metatheoretical concept but rather that their elaboration of the structure concept is especially 
illuminating in the study of American racism. 
 95. William H. Sewell, Jr., A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation, 98 AM. J. 
SOCIO. 1, 7–8 (1992) (referring to schemas as the “semiotic” dimension of social life). 
 96. Id. at 9. 
 97. JUNG, supra note 93, at 26. 
 98. Sewell, supra note 95, at 22. 
 99. Id. Sewell’s use of the term “power” is neither relevant for our purpose here, nor particularly 
illuminating because, on this latter score, the concept simply appears to refer to the degree of intensity 
of potential or actual recourse to resources, and because he also distractingly disregards the extensive 
Foucauldian elaboration of the relationship between power and knowledge (a category that itself 
overlaps with Sewell’s “schemas”). Id. 
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structures.”100 As such, these “deep structural schemas are also 
pervasive, in the sense that they are present in a relatively wide range 
of institutional spheres, practices, and discourses.”101 Deep structural 
schemas also operate most forcefully on the unconscious, in the sense 
that they form part of the background, “taken-for-granted” 
presuppositions that actors apply in ordinary social life without 
taking account of them.102 In Habermasian terms, they are the 
constituents of the lifeworld.103 
Jung’s contribution to the analysis of American race amnesia 
begins with his contention that racism denominates deep Sewellian 
structures of domination based on the schema of race.104 Racism, 
then, is the “vast web of unholy couplings,” practical articulations of 
these schemas and resource flows that instantiate racial domination, 
inequality, and hierarchy.105 Jung specifies that the depth of this 
particular schematic technique—which, we will recall, refers to its 
durability and its susceptibility to naturalization, and the 
corresponding difficulty of “unthinking” it—is attributable to the 
protean capacity of its schemas of suitability/unsuitability and 
superiority/inferiority to reinvent themselves in historically specific 
contexts.106 To study race in America, then, is to investigate the vast 
web of racialized schemas saturating the American experience across 
the entire range of social life, from healthcare to criminality and 
morbidity, from education to employment and then to 
unemployment, across family and church and sexuality and politics.  
Jung contends that “most racist practices are enactments of tacit 
schemas: largely taken for granted, the operative schemas that are 
constitutive of utterances and other practices bypass, override, or 
 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. 
 103. See supra text accompanying notes 41–44. 
 104. See JUNG, supra note 93, at 31–35. Jung defines “race” as the modern mode of differentiating 
categories of persons for political purposes, according to shifting conceptions of putative hereditary 
traits. See id. at 31. 
 105. Id. at 174. 
 106. See id. at 36. 
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influence, to varying degrees, conscious calculation and 
rationalization.”107 Racism is enacted and inscribed in White 
ignorance, nourished more by these tacit schemas than by overt racist 
ideology or conscious practice: “What is continually 
underemphasized and misunderstood in the study of racism, and 
other forms of domination, is the dominant’s massive ignorance.”108 
But the ignorance Jung has in mind here is not the conscious refusal 
to learn or the naïve failure to have already learned, but an 
unconscious ignorance and acceptance of racially subordinating 
structures. 
On this point, Jung relies on Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of doxa, 
which the latter uses to refer to the experience by which systems of 
classification and other beliefs, configurations, exclusions, practices, 
and conceptual frames secure tacit, unanimous, unconscious assent 
on the part of social actors—by which they, in a paradoxical 
formulation, “secur[e] the misrecognition, and hence the recognition, 
of the arbitrariness on which [those systems of classification] are 
based.”109 This theme of disguised arbitrariness pervades Bourdieu’s 
work. 
One of Bourdieu’s main themes was that tacit, taken-for-granted 
beliefs (the realm of the doxa) play a much bigger role than 
conscious decisions, much less inter-subjective discursive agreement, 
in explaining human behavior.110 Of particular interest to both 
Bourdieu and this discussion is the “doxic submission which attaches 
us to the established order with all the ties of the unconscious,”111 as 
 
 107. Id. at 40. 
 108. Id. at 41. 
 109. PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 164 (Richard Nice trans., 1977). 
Bourdieu’s use of doxa recalls Louis Althusser’s theorization of the interpellative function of 
ideology—that is, the phenomenon by which individuals are “always, already” called (or 
“interpellated”) into their subjectivity by rituals of ideological recognition. See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, THE 
REPRODUCTION OF CAPITALISM: IDEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES 189 (G.M. 
Goshgarian trans., 2014). 
 110. See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE 
SOCIOLOGY 25 (1992). 
 111. Pierre Bourdieu, Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field, 12 SOC. 
THEORY 1, 14 (1994). 
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well as the reproduction of hierarchical systems of domination that 
result, including those relating to race.112 In terms that resonate with 
the earlier discussion of Hall, Rogin, and Mills,113 Bourdieu describes 
how unconscious, doxic structures of thought impose a “genesis 
amnesia”—a “forgetting of history which history itself produces by 
incorporating the objective structures [of a society] in [our] second 
natures.”114 Doxa describes how agents’ subjective aspirations tend 
to converge or become identical with the established order, 
naturalizing and disguising the ineradicable arbitrariness of the latter 
in the process.115 
Wherever doxa operates, it exerts a symbolic violence, delimiting 
the range of possible actions, discourse, and outcomes for social 
actors, always in the context of a hierarchical dominant/dominated 
scheme.116 Bourdieu illustrates the concept while analyzing some of 
James Baldwin’s reflections on the psychological experience of 
Black American youth apprehending, not yet consciously, the weight 
of American mid-twentieth century racism: 
Symbolic violence is the coercion which is set up only 
through the consent that the dominated cannot fail to give 
to the dominator (and therefore to the domination) when 
their understanding of the situation and relation can only 
use instruments of knowledge that they have in common 
with the dominator, which, being merely the incorporated 
form of the structure of the relation of domination, make 
this relation appear as natural; or, in other words, when the 
schemes they implement in order to perceive and evaluate 
 
 112. BOURDIEU, supra note 109, at 183–97; see also TERRY EAGLETON, IDEOLOGY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 157 (new ed. 2007) (discussing importance of domination as a driving force in imposing 
doxic structures of belief). 
 113. See supra text accompanying notes 75–89. 
 114. BOURDIEU, supra note 109, at 78–79. 
 115. See id. at 164–68. 
 116. See Bourdieu, supra note 111, at 3–4 (noting how a social actor uses symbolic violence to 
“incarnate[] itself simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures and 
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themselves or to perceive and evaluate the dominators 
(high/low, male/female, white/black, etc.) are the product 
of the incorporation of the (thus naturalized) classifications 
of which their social being is the product.117 
On the other hand, those occupying privileged social positions 
internalize and reproduce the social structures (in the form of 
rationalizations, myths, and imagery) from which they benefit.118 In 
the end, Bourdieu’s social theory simply leaves comparatively little 
space for the sort of rationalistic, discursive resolution of 
disagreements, making the marshalling of disparity data to illuminate 
the radically disparate material experiences and opinions of Black 
people rather pointless.  
Jung’s important contribution is to apply the Bourdieusian 
concepts of doxa and symbolic violence to racism and white 
supremacy in the United States. He elaborates two complementary 
forms of symbolic violence in service of doxic ignorance, which he 
labels symbolic coercion and symbolic perversity.119 Even if one can 
quibble with the somewhat opaque terminology, the concepts move 
beyond Bourdieu’s basic schema in ways that advance analysis of 
race (and racial disparity) discourse. Importantly, the phenomena 
denoted by these concepts will handicap any efforts to use racial 
disparity data to achieve a rationalistic consensus on matters of race. 
 
 117. PIERRE BOURDIEU, PASCALIAN MEDITATIONS 170 (Richard Nice trans., Stanford Univ. Press 
2000). Here, in 1997, Bourdieu is discussing Baldwin’s famous 1962 essay, The Fire Next Time, which 
furnished the conceit (a letter to one’s younger relative about the horrors of American racism) that 
Ta-Nehisi Coates more recently used in his acclaimed 2015 title Between the World and Me. Bourdieu 
published his first systematic formulation of the notions of symbolic power, doxa, habitus, and field in 
1972 under the title Outline of a Theory of Practice. See generally BOURDIEU, supra note 109. In that 
book, he discussed social domination extensively, but without mentioning racial subordination, instead 
focusing on sex and class domination. Id. at 183. By the end of his career and life, he had obviously 
begun to appreciate how racial domination was a setting to which his concepts had direct application. 
 118. See ROGERS BRUBAKER, GROUNDS FOR DIFFERENCE 38 (2015) (discussing Bourdieu’s concept 
of symbolic violence). This process, which involves members of dominant groups adjusting their 
expectations and aspirations to their opportunities and internalizing schemas of classification, 
perception, and evaluation that systematically valorize their own dominant positions, is a theoretical 
frame within which to situate much of the ubiquitous, but undertheorized, talk of “white privilege.” Id. 
 119. See generally JUNG, supra note 93. 
34
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [2021], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss4/7
2021] AGAINST DISCOURSE 1211 
 
Symbolic coercion describes the phenomenon by which dominant 
actors are unable to consciously recognize arguments originating in 
dominated, subaltern classes and populations of society that seek to 
challenge deeply held, structural beliefs about hierarchy.120 If 
symbolic violence generally designates the unconscious assent of 
both the dominant and the dominated to the established social order, 
symbolic coercion, according to Jung, denotes a specific context in 
which symbolic violence occurs: the “conscious disagreement of the 
dominated that goes unconsciously unrecognized by the 
dominant.”121 The concept gives theoretical context to the frequent 
complaints of subordinated groups that they feel “voiceless” and 
“vulnerable” vis-à-vis dominant social strata distinguished by racial 
position or other possession of social or financial capital. Those 
populating subordinated social strata—which, in the United States, 
refers to poor Black and indigenous people more than anyone else—
are not only subjected to arbitrary physical and economic violence, 
they are also subjected to the coercive symbolic violence that 
legitimates police brutality, social welfare retrenchment, public 
services divestment, discrimination in financial services, and 
unemployment—and everything else supported by ideological 
concepts ranging from “colorblindness” and “underclass culture”122 
to credit scoring and “broken windows” policing—by disregarding 
any critiques of those institutional forms. 
Bourdieu anticipated Jung’s concept of symbolic coercion, albeit 
obliquely. He noted that if subaltern, heterodox groups seek to 
rupture matters of doxic consensus, they should expect that, in 
response to any success they have, the dominant relations will 
respond by converting one form of capital (financial, usually) into 
another form of capital (social, usually), through, for example, 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 121. 
 122. On the underclass myth, see generally Adolph Reed, Jr., The Underclass Myth, in CLASS NOTES: 
POSING AS POLITICS AND OTHER THOUGHTS ON THE AMERICAN SCENE 93 (2000). 
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donations to foundations and research institutions.123 Or they might 
determine, as Jamie Dimon did, that it is easier to just take a knee.124  
Symbolic perversity, like symbolic coercion, refers to a type of 
ignorance on the part of dominant social actors, but here the 
discourse that is occluded is not that of the dominated, but that of the 
dominant themselves. Put in terms of race: 
[T]he dominant, whether they be institutions or individuals, 
are typically well aware of many persistent racial 
inequalities, beyond those politicized and brought to their 
attention by subaltern discourses. The dominant possess 
discursive knowledge of the reality that certain racial 
[categories] of actors systematically fare worse than 
themselves and others. Much of this knowledge is produced 
by dominant institutions, like state agencies, research 
universities, and news media. Yet the dominant’s 
consumption and circulation of this knowledge are 
censored and structured by an underlying racial logic that 
implicitly assumes radical difference between categories of 
people and renders the suffering of some incommensurable 
with and less worthy than the suffering of others. They can 
and do know about the suffering of their racial others, but 
this knowledge fails to register or matter . . . . The effect of 
this knowing–unknowing is depraved indifference to racial 
inequalities—depraved for its knowingness but indifferent 
in usually unknowing, unreflective ways.125 
This knowing–unknowing echoes Bourdieu’s description of the 
paradoxical nature of doxa: that it simultaneously secures the 
misrecognition, and hence the recognition, of the arbitrariness on 
which systems of classification, and therefore systems of domination, 
 
 123. See BOURDIEU, supra note 109, at 196–97. 
 124. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
 125. JUNG, supra note 93, at 143 (emphasis added). 
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rest.126 Through the notions of symbolic coercion (with its focus on 
tacit nonrecognition of dominated discourse) and symbolic perversity 
(with its focus on tacit nonrecognition of discourse produced by 
dominant social actors), Jung explains how the established and 
dominant institutions of American society struggle to meaningfully 
redress racial disparity, even where those very same institutions are 
the sites of production for the evidence of disparity.127 To be sure, 
Bourdieu and Jung are not making descriptive generalizations about 
the subjective intentions or cognitive capacities of individual people; 
instead, they are shedding light on the ways that individual agency 
and intentional action are unavoidably mediated by a classificatory, 
schematic social structure in which, as Jung documents, race plays an 
important organizing role. 
These authors caution us against setting our expectations too high 
when it comes to using disparity discourse in conversations with 
dominant racial incumbents.128 On the one hand, we might imagine 
that continuing to draw attention to historical and empirical data 
concerning racially disparate treatment and outcomes might change 
the doxa itself,129 and thereby clear the way for transformed 
schema-resource combinations in matters related to race. In Mills’s 
formulation, such a strategy naïvely ignores that White ignorance is 
White ignorance, a largely one-sided ignorance, the maintenance of 
which inures exclusively to the benefit of the dominant, ruling 
group.130 Jung and Bourdieu are even more direct about the 
importance of dominant interests as creators of the established 
 
 126. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 109. 
 127. JUNG, supra note 93, at 143. 
 128. Id.; MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52, at 47.   
 129. Such a strategic orientation would resonate with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s theorization 
of the “multitude” that, by engaging in spontaneous micro-struggles, might catalyze new social 
subjectivities that can organize themselves effectively, create lasting institutions, and eventually 
transform social relations not predicated on dominance. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, 
ASSEMBLY 328 (2017) [hereinafter HARDT & NEGRI, ASSEMBLY]; MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, 
MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF EMPIRE 66, 81 (2004) [hereinafter HARDT & 
NEGRI, MULTITUDE]. Hardt and Negri conceptualize mobilizations of the multitude as struggles against 
doxa, expressly invoking Bourdieu. See HARDT & NEGRI, ASSEMBLY, supra, at 258. 
 130. See MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52, at 39–40. 
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common sense.131 Doxa is not just a particular point of view; it is the 
point of view of the dominant that establishes itself as universal, 
legitimating the established social order.132 Racial disparities are 
perceived by dominant racial groups to ratify the naturalized social 
order responsible for their creation and reproduction—hence 
Bourdieu’s concept of “genesis amnesia,” discussed above.133  
On the other hand, we might imagine that shedding light on racial 
disparities will clear the way for rationalistic consensus among Black 
and White individuals. This second objective is, at first blush, more 
credible, and for that reason, its likely failure is more frustrating, 
even tragic. Even if the initial attempts to achieve rough consensus 
fall short because of Dawson’s point about the present lack of shared 
lifeworld consensus,134 perhaps continued discursive engagement can 
forge lifeworld understandings on the basis of which future 
consensus might be achieved. The aim would be to disturb and 
expose the arbitrariness of the unconscious, doxic, amnesiac beliefs 
and schemas concerning superiority and inferiority that underwrite 
much of what passes for common sense on matters related to race, 
including the naturalization of disparate outcomes. Some antiracists 
hold out hope for such a mutual understanding in spite of the 
pervasive and deep dimensions of White collective forgetting.  
For instance, Thomas McCarthy, a Habermasian critical theorist, 
has proposed a new “politics of memory” through a systematic 
dedication, including through reparations, to bridging the “peculiar 
gap” between historical scholarship and lay understanding of the 
significance of race in U.S. history as well as present reality.135 
However, Mills and Jung warn us not to underestimate the cognitive 
embeddedness of racial schemas reproduced by the doxa and its 
 
 131. See BOURDIEU, supra note 109, at 169. 
 132. See Bourdieu, supra note 111, at 15. 
 133. See supra text accompanying note 114. 
 134. See supra text accompanying note 51. 
 135. See Thomas McCarthy, Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of the Memory 
of Slavery, 30 POL. THEORY 623, 624 (2002) (modeling his proposal on the German response to the 
Holocaust). 
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accompanying symbolic violence.136 If they are even partially 
correct, many White Americans will (and do) struggle to understand 
the world their ancestors made and they themselves reproduce.137 
Perhaps, when it comes to matters of race, the real contribution of 
Habermas and the discourse theorists is not to provide us a practical 
roadmap for establishing a new, discursively grounded consensus on 
race and racism, but to implicitly demonstrate the wide, possibly 
unbridgeable gulf between extant psychological and imaginative 
capacities for many Americans and the real, solidaristic conditions of 
possibility for a political solution grounded in rational discourse.138  
IV. SO, WHAT SHOULD WE DO WITH DISPARITY DISCOURSE? 
If Mills and Jung are roughly correct in their diagnosis of the 
problem, then two things become clear. First, antiracist politics and 
practice, including discussion of racial disparities, should not be 
conceptualized predominantly, if at all, as a rationalistic project to 
convince White people of anything.139 Devoting attentional and 
financial resources to organizing discursive spaces and exposing 
implicit biases will likely not be the most effective strategy for an 
emancipatory politics. Moreover, doing so risks cementing liberal 
ideological conceits that, for instance, conceptualize racism as an 
individual psychological demerit isolated from the dominant political 
economy and established social order.140 Second, as a correlate, 
antiracists must search for a new model for oppositional politics, 
unanchored to rationalistic discourse theory. However, Mills and 
 
 136. See generally JUNG, supra note 93; MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52.  
 137. See supra text accompanying note 77. 
 138. See supra text accompanying note 46 (discussing the importance of solidarity to discourse 
theory). 
 139. Of course, throughout history, some members of dominant groups have contributed to struggles 
of dominated groups. The point here is not about individual action as much as it is about the general 
orientation of political programs. See also text accompanying notes 91 and 92 (describing how Mills 
himself specifies that White ignorance is neither confined to White people nor meant to refer to all 
White people). 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 60–66. 
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Jung only provide a few preliminary signposts for how to think about 
this project. 
Mills and Jung (along with Bourdieu) are vulnerable to the critique 
that their theories suggest that racial domination has congealed into 
an ontological structure that deterministically forecloses any agency 
for those committed to extirpating race thinking.141 To that extent, 
their perspectives might invite comparisons with Afropessimist 
accounts that see the dominant White society not so much as 
cognitively limited by its own self-imposed ideological apparatus as 
essentially and primally rooted in violence against and 
dehumanization of African-descended peoples.142 Adolph Reed 
criticizes this position as an “idealist mystification that posits a 
primordial white racism or a transhistorical, reified White Supremacy 
capable of acting in the world.”143 Ultimately, Jung and Mills might 
flirt with this sort of pessimism, but they distance themselves at the 
last instance.144 Their important contribution to highlight the doxic 
(and toxic) structures of racism, as well as their cognitive and 
epistemological effects on White American, prompts a question they 
ultimately do not yet answer satisfactorily.  
Since leveling his critique of the epistemology of White ignorance 
in The Racial Contract, Mills has more recently argued in Black 
Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism that “[o]nly 
by starting to break these rules and meta-rules can we begin the long 
process that will lead back to the eventual overcoming of this white 
darkness and the achievement of an enlightenment that is genuinely 
 
 141. See generally JUNG, supra note 93; MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52. 
 142. See FRANK B. WILDERSON III, AFROPESSIMISM 15 (2020) (“Blacks are not Human subjects, but 
are instead structurally inert props, implements for the execution of White and non-Black fantasies and 
sadomasochistic pleasures . . . .”); Frank Wilderson, III, Gramsci’s Black Marx: Whither the Slave in 
Civil Society, 9 SOC. IDENTITIES 225, 239 n.1 (2003) (arguing that the “constituent elements of civil 
society are . . . anti-black”). 
 143. Adolph Reed, Jr., What Materialist Black Political History Actually Looks Like, NONSITE.ORG 
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://nonsite.org/what-materialist-black-political-history-actually-looks-like/ 
[https://perma.cc/86BK-EQSE]; see also Michael C. Dawson, Hidden in Plain Sight: A Note on 
Legitimation Crises and the Racial Order, 3 CRITICAL HIST. STUD. 143, 157–59 (2016) (criticizing 
Afropessimistic accounts that posit a reified white supremacy isolated from the evolving political 
economy). 
 144. See generally JUNG, supra note 93; MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 52. 
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multiracial.”145 In that latter book, which in the main restates his 
“racial contract” thesis in the context of a broader critique of 
liberalism, he sketches out in the epilogue an undeveloped 
placeholder concept of radical Black liberalism.146 This project, as he 
briefly describes it there, would synthesize Kant, Marx, and Du Bois 
in developing a notion of free development of individuals (Kant), 
unencumbered by capitalist exploitation (Marx), and emancipated 
from race thinking altogether (Du Bois).147  
To be sure, he specifies that his radical Black liberalism is, as of 
now, just an outline, but in responding to a “Can this work?” query, 
he can only manage to say: “There are no guarantees, but then no 
other competing ideology can offer them either.”148 All he can say, 
for now at least, is that radical Black liberalism is a materialist 
perspective that does not place its hopes for social transformation on 
moral suasion and rationalist discourse, but on the mobilization of 
group interests.149 Mills, at least in this preliminary exposition of this 
new political concept, provides us little guidance about how to 
marshal disparity data and moral arguments to contribute to this 
broader materialist politics.150 This is hardly surprising, given that so 
much of his argument concerns the ideological baggage obfuscating 
and conditioning the perception of interests, especially for White 
Americans. This political terrain—marrying a materialist, 
programmatic, and pragmatic commitment to movement building 
with an honest encounter with race thinking and racism—is a thorny 
nettle.151 
Jung, for his part, is ultimately able to locate a historical subject in 
the struggle to achieve an emancipatory antiracism: people of color 
themselves. If racism is structural in the Bourdieusian/Sewellian 
 
 145. See MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS, supra note 52, at 71. 
 146. See id.  
 147. See id. at 203–04. 
 148. Id. at 206. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See id.  
 151. See generally KAREN E. FIELDS & BARBARA J. FIELDS, RACECRAFT: THE SOUL OF INEQUALITY 
IN AMERICAN LIFE (2014). 
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sense, then emancipatory politics must aim to disrupt that structure, 
and people of color are the only possible agent with the capacity to 
do so: 
[A]ntiracism demands efforts to transform, more or less 
radically, the structure in question. At whatever scale, it is 
about disrupting racism’s smooth reproduction, the routine 
articulation of its schemas and resources. Who is to 
perform such acts of subversion? If the distribution of 
critical knowledge is inversely related to hierarchies of 
power and the distribution of ignorance, as I contend, the 
struggle against white supremacy, as in the past, will be led 
by people of color. This is not to say that whites cannot and 
will not join the fight, but it is less likely. It is harder for 
them to access and accept critical knowledge that is, on the 
whole, foreign to or at odds with their habitus and even 
harder to put into practice . . . .152 
In short, antiracists should not wait for an accumulation of 
epiphanic moments on the part of White Americans to disrupt the 
deep structure of racism in the United States. That much is, I think, 
inarguably true. 
Still, his roadmap is no clearer than that of Mills, consisting of a 
few references to “disruptive, often unlawful, acts” and “acts of 
disobedience.”153 He borrows from Asef Bayat’s conceptualization of 
“social nonmovements” that, when met with repression, can turn into 
bona fide social movements.154 The example from Bayat’s book that 
he cites as an example of success in that arena—the 2006 “Gran 
Marcha” migrant protests—only underscores the need for a fuller 
 
 152. JUNG, supra note 93, at 177–78.  
 153. Id. at 178. 
 154. See id. at 179. On this point, Jung misses an opportunity to engage with Hardt and Negri’s work 
on the emancipatory energy contained in the dispersed but coordinated networks of cooperative 
relationships that pervade contemporary social life. See HARDT & NEGRI, ASSEMBLY, supra note 129, at 
21. 
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account of the agency of subordinated racial groups.155 Although the 
protests were an impressive demonstration of solidarity and a call for 
action, at this conjuncture it seems an exaggeration to suggest that 
they contributed to a durable political movement up to the task of 
altering the structures that underwrite anti-immigrant racism in the 
United States.  
In borrowing from Bourdieu, Jung makes himself susceptible to a 
frequent criticism of Bourdieu: that his contributions to social theory 
emphasize reproduction and continuity to such a degree that they fail 
to account for ruptures and creativity, and that his concepts of 
habitus, field, and doxa unduly constrict the space for political 
agency.156 Although these criticisms of Bourdieu are contestable,157 it 
is unsurprising that Jung, having leaned so heavily on Bourdieu, 
arguably finds himself in the same position. 
Nevertheless, Jung’s specification that people of color will lead the 
struggle against White supremacy is a helpful starting point to 
imagine a way forward. Dawson’s survey research demonstrates a 
“substantial potential for mobilization to progressive causes within 
most black communities.”158 Much of his recent work documents 
how radical tendencies in Black politics became integrated into the 
existing social order, dissipating their once-powerful energies.159 
This story, as Dawson recounts it, is a complex one, involving the 
integration of many Black elites into the existing political and 
economic order, an uncritical and antidemocratic embrace of Maoism 
among radical contingents of 1960s and 1970s Black nationalists, 
consistent and pervasive anti-Black racism within putatively mass 
 
 155. See ASEF BAYAT, LIFE AS POLITICS: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE CHANGE THE MIDDLE EAST 24–
25 (2d ed. 2013). 
 156. See, e.g., David Swartz, Pierre Bourdieu, in FIFTY KEY SOCIOLOGISTS: THE CONTEMPORARY 
THEORISTS 39, 44–45 (John Scott ed., 2007); WILLIAM H. SEWELL, JR., LOGICS OF HISTORY: SOCIAL 
THEORY AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 139 (2005). 
 157. See generally Johan Heilbron & George Steinmetz, A Defense of Bourdieu, 2 CATALYST 35 
(2018); PIERRE BOURDIEU, Social Scientists, Economic Science and the Social Movement, in ACTS OF 
RESISTANCE: AGAINST THE NEW MYTHS OF OUR TIME 52 (Richard Nice trans., 1998) (demonstrating 
Bourdieu’s firm political commitments and solidarity with social movements). 
 158. DAWSON, supra note 24, at 11. 
 159. Id. 
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leftist parties throughout the twentieth century, and the ravaging 
effects of deep poverty, unemployment, and precarity among large 
segments of the Black population during the neoliberal era.160 The 
result is that today “blacks no longer have anywhere near the 
ideological resources they had during the last century for productive 
utopian thinking and debate.”161  
However, Dawson also highlights the potential for disparity 
discourse to help galvanize a new radical, vanguard Black politics: 
[T]he wide range of substantial racial and socioeconomic 
disparities still to be found in health care, crime and 
punishment, and a host of other areas of life . . . provide the 
foundation for the continuing radical edge to black public 
opinion. There is still a need for a militant wing of black 
politics to address these disadvantages, as it has become 
clear over the past three decades that those engaged in 
“mainstream” politics have proven insufficient to bring 
about the fundamental change needed to address these 
problems, and perhaps are uninterested in doing so.162 
Nikhil Singh, in his 2004 book Black Is a Country, makes a similar 
call for redevelopment of the Black subaltern counterpublic.163 
Again, this project should not be primarily conceptualized as a 
rationalistic, discursive politics. To do so is to invite ineffectualness 
 
 160. See id. passim. See generally Michael Dawson, 3 of 10 Theses on Neoliberalism in the U.S. 
During the Early 21st Century, 6 CARCERAL NOTEBOOKS 11 (2010).  
 161. DAWSON, supra note 24, at 186. Dawson described the Black political landscape in these terms 
in 2013, and it is fair to wonder if he would temper this assessment somewhat today, following the 2020 
protests and the election of two Black socialists to Congress. See Maurice Isserman, Congress Now Has 
More Socialists Than Ever Before in U.S. History, IN THESE TIMES (Jan. 11, 2021), 
https://inthesetimes.com/article/democratic-socialism-dsa-aoc-bernie-sanders-congress 
[https://perma.cc/6J4L-NN6H] (reporting on the November 2020 elections of Congresspersons Cori 
Bush and Jamaal Bowman, both members of the Democratic Socialists of America); cf. FUTURES OF 
BLACK RADICALISM (Gaye Theresa Johnson & Alex Lubin eds., 2017) (collecting essays organized 
around the theme of renewed engagement with the history of Black radical movements and thought). 
 162. DAWSON, supra note 24, at 16. 
 163. SINGH, supra note 17, at 224. 
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and co-optation and, ultimately, to further cement the established 
order, including its racialized dominance hierarchies. 
To be clear, the argument is hardly that we should reject discourse 
theory, much less Habermasian social theory. Instead, the argument 
is that its model of discursive rationality among coequal participants 
sharing a lifeworld and solidaristic relations is not the best political 
vector to proceed along in this domain. However, it will not do to 
simply reject discourse; we need to come up with something else. 
V. CHANTAL MOUFFE’S “AGONISTIC PLURALISM” AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO DISCOURSE THEORY 
Chantal Mouffe’s theorization of politics as “agonistic 
pluralism”164 provides a more promising framework within which to 
think about the ongoing efforts to build this vanguard radical Black 
politics. Her concept foregrounds inter-group, pluralistic struggle, 
and defines itself in large part against the rationalistic discourse 
theory of Habermas (Mouffe prefers the term “agonistic” over 
“antagonistic” because the latter, she argues, denotes a relationship 
between enemies, whereas the former denotes a relationship of 
adversaries or rivals for power desiring to organize their shared 
“symbolic space” in different ways).165 
For Mouffe, political theory during the post-war period largely 
settled on an aggregative model of liberal democracy that grew out of 
liberal commitments to individualism and a strict conceptual divide 
between a private life where preferences were forged (in 
neighborhoods, churches, trade unions, families, fraternal 
organizations, and the like) and a public life where those preferences 
were weighed in the market for votes and policy.166 Aggregative 
pluralist democracy’s solution to the problem of social order and 
integration was to view public life, then, solely as a place of 
 
 164. See MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 80–107. 
 165. Id. at 13. 
 166. Id. at 81–83.  
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compromise among interest groups, deprived of any normative 
content.167 Power differentials, including those residing along the 
deep social fault lines attributable to racism, dropped out of this 
picture altogether, except insofar as they expressed themselves in the 
struggle for political and economic power—as the result of “simple 
competition among interests taking place in a neutral terrain.”168  
Theories of a deliberative, rationalistic, discursive model of liberal 
democracy—the most important of which were those of Habermas 
and Rawls—arose in response to the perceived failures of this 
aggregative model to establish a credible normative underpinning and 
to stabilize the economy and broader society.169 These theories 
sought to imagine the conditions of possibility for a consensus that 
depended not on aggregating, via markets and brokerage politics, 
preferences formed antecedently in a purely private realm, but on 
deliberative forms of association predicated on equality rather than 
exclusion and power. 
Mouffe shares the rationalist discourse theorists’ concern that the 
aggregative model mystifies and obscures questions of power, 
exclusion, and inequality. But to her, rationalistic social theory 
performs a similar move, hiding the irreducible dimension of 
antagonism inherent in human relations in an idealized concept of 
“discourse.”170 Her agonistic model of politics centers around 
conflicts over power, rather than discourse: 
 
 167. Id. at 82. Mouffe assigns pride of place to Joseph Schumpeter and Anthony Downs, but other 
important figures include political pluralists like Robert Dahl, David Truman, Earl Latham, and Ted 
Lowi, as well as the “neopluralist” economists who formalized and translated the political pluralists’ 
insights into the language of economics, such as Gary Becker. For an overview of political pluralism, 
see Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 31–32 (1998); and Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An 
Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617 (1985). 
 168. ERNESTO LACLAU & CHANTAL MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY: TOWARDS A 
RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, at xvi (2d ed. 2001). 
 169. This is especially true of Habermas. One of his signal contributions to social theory in the 1970s 
was to show how the welfare statism that superintended this aggregative politics during the postwar 
period had entered a legitimation crisis as “new Keynesian” fantasies of state management of the 
economy for the benefit of all social classes collapsed. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 
LEGITIMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975). 
 170. MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 101. To be fair, Habermas and Benhabib recognize that the “ideal 
speech situation” underlying their discourse theory of communicative rationality is a counterfactually 
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[A] non-exclusive public sphere of rational argument is a 
conceptual impossibility. Conflict and division . . . are 
neither disturbances that unfortunately cannot be eliminated 
nor empirical impediments that render impossible the full 
realization of a harmony that we cannot attain because we 
will never be able to leave our particularities completely 
aside in order to act in accordance with our rational 
self . . . . Indeed, we maintain that without conflict and 
division, a pluralist democratic politics would be 
impossible.171 
In fact, any temporary semblance of consensus is the result of a 
provisional hegemony functioning to stabilize power relations. 
Although the terminology is different,172 Mouffe’s concept of 
hegemony is a close conceptual cognate of Bourdieu’s doxa and 
symbolic violence.173 “Social division,” far from being able to be 
reined in by rationalistic politics, “is inherent in the possibility of 
politics, and . . . in the very possibility of democratic politics.”174 In 
contemporary liberal societies, there is always an “ineradicable 
pluralism of value,” a basal antagonism that cannot be rationalized 
away through discourse or anything else.175 And, importantly, “[n]o 
amount of dialogue and moral preaching will ever convince the 
ruling class to give up its power.”176 
If we accept that pluralistic power struggle, rather than discourse, 
is the substance of politics, then the main question is not how to 
eliminate power relations and exclusion through realization of 
 
posited and idealized thought experiment that, although possessing normative force, does not refer to 
concrete societies situated in space, time, and history. See HABERMAS, supra note 43, at 323–24; 
BENHABIB, supra note 39, at 285–86. 
 171. LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note 168, at xvii. 
 172. MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 21. Mouffe grows out of a Marxian tradition from which Bourdieu 
sought to distance himself. See Mathieu Hikaru Desan, Bourdieu, Marx, and Capital: A Critique of the 
Extension Model, 31 SOCIO. THEORY 318, 318 (2013). 
 173. See EAGLETON, supra note 112, at 158. 
 174. LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note 168, at xiv. 
 175. MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 102; see also ERNESTO LACLAU, ON POPULIST REASON 169 (2005). 
 176. MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 15. 
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rational consensus, but how to constitute new forms of power that are 
more consistent with democratic values in a pluralistic world divided 
by class, race, and so forth.177 Ultimately, the goal of politics is to 
confront and convert, not to convince.178 The goal is to usher in a 
new hegemonic articulation that looks neither to preference 
aggregation nor to rationalistic discourse, but to a democratic logic 
based on a “chain of equivalence” that links together struggles 
against all forms of subordination and domination.179 
In Mouffe’s estimation, inequality—that perennial preoccupation 
of left politics180—must be the backbone of an attempt to articulate 
and establish a new hegemonic phase of liberal democracy; further, it 
must take account of the multiplicity of social relations in which 
inequality requires a forceful challenge.181 There is no more powerful 
primary material for this agonistic politics than the experience of 
real, material exclusion and subordination within a dominant social 
formation, which brings us to the present conjuncture of American 
politics.  
Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism offers a much better chance than 
discourse theory to potentially destabilize the doxic consensus of the 
range of possibilities for organizing social relations, including those 
thematized around race.182 But such a project must be ambitious; if 
we even partially accept the force of the arguments of Bourdieu, 
 
 177. See id. at 100. 
 178. See id. at 102. 
 179. LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note 168, at xviii; see also PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A 
THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 67 (1997) (asking “[h]ow might we enable a person who is 
danger of being dominated to achieve non-domination?”). This concept of the “chain of equivalence” 
complements Martha Fineman’s “vulnerability” theory. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The 
Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008) 
(theorizing a new “vulnerable subject” concept, defined in relation to the universal and constant 
experience of human vulnerability, on which to build a new approach to social policy and law). 
Fineman’s vulnerability thesis could be thought of as a micro-foundation for Mouffe’s macro-theory of 
agonistic pluralism. See id. 
 180. See NORBERTO BOBBIO, LEFT AND RIGHT: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF A POLITICAL DISTINCTION 71 
(Allan Cameron trans., 1996). 
 181. See MOUFFE, supra note 44, at 123. 
 182. See LACLAU & MOUFFE, supra note 168, at xi; Fuyuki Kurasawa, An Alternative Transnational 
Public Sphere? On Anarchist Cosmopolitanism in Post-Westphalian Times, in TRANSNATIONALIZING 
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 79, 93 (Kate Nash ed., 2014). 
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Jung, and Mills, any effort to denaturalize and demystify the social 
and psychological consciousness of race in America today will 
require the affirmative articulation of a new hegemonic vision. 
In this connection, Stuart Hall made two observations in the late 
1980s that today’s antiracists and progressives would do well to 
remember: first, politics does not reflect majorities—it constructs 
them; and second, modern electorates do not think in terms of 
policies, but in terms of images.183 Politics constructs majorities in a 
very precise manner, by bringing together multiple and 
heterogenous—Mouffe would say “agonistically plural”—groups, 
with different social positions and different material interests, to form 
a social bloc.184 The social bloc that goes on to express itself 
electorally as a political majority—and hopefully through even 
stabler institutional forms that sustain the always provisional and 
partial unity of the bloc—is forged ideologically through its 
participants’ adherence to a type of political imagery about the 
concept of citizenship—the type of person who is valued, the type of 
activities that are valued, and the type of politics that demands 
representation.  
How can racial disparity discourse contribute to an agonistic 
politics focused on forming and solidifying a new solidaristic social 
bloc committed to democratizing social relations and eliminating 
subordination and exploitation on grounds of race and otherwise—a 
politics unfocused on, if not entirely indifferent to, the prospect of 
consensus with White Americans? What use is disparity discourse in 
a world where one of the main enemies is White supremacy, but 
convincing White people is not really on the table in any meaningful 
way? The house is offering low odds for a White law professor being 
the one to light the way, and I hardly aim to do so here. Nevertheless, 
in the following material, I offer some impressionistic suggestions 
 
 183. HALL, supra note 78, at 238, 246. 
 184. See supra text accompanying notes 164–179. 
49
Weber: Against Discourse
Published by Reading Room, 2021
1226 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:4 
and recommended reading for those interested in the case for a new 
radical and agonistic politics of race.185 
VI. ON THE “REAL UTOPIA” OF A REINVIGORATED, RADICAL, AND 
AGONISTIC BLACK POLITICS 
If Dawson is correct about the latent potential of a reinvigorated, 
radical, Black political vanguard, then implications follow for the 
deployment of disparity data. As an initial matter, our expectations 
for disparity discourse will require us to be mindful of the audience. 
The political use of disparity data today appears to be largely 
predicated on an effort to convince White people (and other people 
situated in dominant social strata) of a reality that is, and always has 
been, manifestly before their eyes. In a world where the goal is to 
convince a White audience, it might make sense to marshal the 
disparity data to shed light on the lived reality that Black and White 
Americans tend to have different relationships to the concepts of 
opportunity, on the one hand, and depredation and precarity, on the 
other. The problem is, as Mills and Jung point out, shedding light 
only works if we can credibly expect the other person to see.186  
On the other hand, if we conceive of the relevant task as the 
deployment of disparity data before a predominantly non-White 
audience to catalyze the development of the new radical politics that 
Dawson advocates, the implications change dramatically.187 Black 
Americans already possess sophisticated and nuanced understandings 
of the pervasive racial disparities in most domains of contemporary 
American social life.188 Consequently, the case for deploying 
disparity data in the context of a reinvigorated oppositional Black 
politics requires further specification. It becomes at first more 
opaque, but in clarifying it, we sharpen its political usefulness 
significantly. The point is not to ignore the serious problems of racial 
 
 185. See infra Part VI. 
 186. See JUNG, supra note 93, at 176. 
 187. DAWSON, supra note 24, at 204–06. 
 188. See Smith & King, supra note 12. 
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disparities but to actualize a politics that starts from the assumption 
that such pervasive disparities exist—indeed, that they are the 
primary motivation for that politics. It is important to focus on three 
such implications. 
The first implication is straightforward and uncontroversial. In this 
context, disparity data can serve as agenda-setting signposts, 
directing attentional and financial resources to concrete political 
programs. To adapt Adorno’s maxim discussed earlier, the disparities 
testifying to the greatest “woe” should be the first to which 
attentional and material resources should “go.”189 
Second, a radical, oppositional political program confronting racial 
disparities will focus more on articulating forceful public demands 
for institutional reform—prison and death penalty abolition, cessation 
of surveillance, an end to imperialist wars, greater democratic control 
of state provisioning at all levels of government, infrastructure 
investments, demilitarization of police, universal healthcare, job 
guarantees, reparations, and the like. Different organized 
collectivities with different degrees of militancy and different 
priorities will advocate for different goals, but the crucial point is that 
an agonistic, radical politics opens with a demand and an expectation, 
not an argument. As Mouffe phrases it, the aim is to confront and 
convert, not to convince.190 Or, if the reader prefers Du Bois, it is not 
enough to simply tell people the truth; what is required is to act on 
the truth.191 Of course, compromises and explanations are to be 
expected, but are not the focus or emphasis of such a politics.  
The third implication is arguably the most important. By 
dispensing with the need to convince anyone that racial disparities 
are real social facts that require redress, a radical approach to 
disparity data can move on to the more important task of 
investigating, publicizing, and organizing around the political–
 
 189. See supra text accompanying note 13 (discussing Adorno’s “[w]oe speaks: ‘[g]o’” quip in the 
context of racial disparity). 
 190. See supra text accompanying note 178. 
 191. See supra text accompanying note 2. 
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economic factors responsible for reproducing the disparities.192 The 
word “radical” does not only mean “extreme”; it also means, true to 
its etymological Latin source radix, “of, relating to, or proceeding 
from a root.”193 A politics deserves the name radical when it 
commits itself to uncovering the root causes of social problems in the 
neoliberal political economy, deracinating those root causes and 
rooting new institutions in their place. Robin Kelley describes just 
this sort of project: “We must go to the root—the historical, social, 
cultural, ideological, material, economic root—of oppression in order 
to understand its negation, the prospect of our liberation.”194 A 
disparity is always the result of some network of underlying causes, 
and a radical approach to politics will aim to situate disparity data in 
the context of the ongoing evolution of regimes of hierarchy, rather 
than with metaphysical, hypostatized placeholder concepts like 
“systemic racism.”195  
To be sure, systemic racism exists, but the term just describes the 
condition obtaining when a social system is characterized by a dense 
constellation of material disadvantages distributed according to 
ascriptive racial categories. The roots of these disadvantages must be 
identified and understood before any progress can be made in 
addressing them individually, let alone depriving them of their 
systemic prevalence. Furthermore, the roots of racial disparities 
intertwine with the social structures of race, class, and gender in 
logarithmically complex ways, complicating logarithmically the 
political task of remediation.196 As critical Black studies scholar 
 
 192. See Charisse Burden-Stelly, Why Claudia Jones Will Always Be More Relevant than Ta-Nehisi 
Coates, BLACK AGENDA REP. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.blackagendareport.com/why-claudia-jones-
will-always-be-more-relevant-ta-nehisi-coates [https://perma.cc/A3MR-SDC9]. 
 193. Radical, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/radical 
[https://perma.cc/DXV7-BXXJ]. 
 194. Robin D.G. Kelley, Black Study, Black Struggle, BOS. REV. (Mar. 7, 2016), 
http://bostonreview.net/forum/robin-d-g-kelley-black-study-black-struggle [https://perma.cc/76AR-
4UPF]. 
 195. See Reed, supra note 19, at 268. 
 196. CEDRIC JOHNSON, REVOLUTIONARIES TO RACE LEADERS: BLACK POWER AND THE MAKING OF 
AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICS, at xxxix (2007); see also Lily Hu, Race, Policing, and the Limits of 
Social Science, BOS. REV. (May 6, 2021), http://bostonreview.net/science-nature-race/lily-hu-race-
policing-and-limits-social-science (explaining how establishing causal inference in the context of social 
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Charisse Burden-Stelly puts it, in American history “antiblackness is 
inextricable from the suppression of labor, the deportation of ‘alien’ 
progressives, the incarceration of anti-capitalists, the indictment of 
communists and ‘fellow travelers,’ the censure of demands for 
fundamental redistribution, and the overall repression of the left.”197  
In the face of this complexity, some political theorists, like Adolph 
Reed, would prefer to jettison racial disparity discourse altogether in 
an effort to foster cross-racial mass movement politics devoted to 
emancipatory political–economic transformation and organized 
around dinner table issues such as jobs, education, healthcare, and 
housing.198 For Reed and his like-minded comrades,199 the danger is 
that disparity discourse tends to elide the nuanced exploration of the 
historical and political–economic context of race and racism, 
focusing narrowly on the disparity itself. In the process, it frames 
social justice in terms of equal distributions of goods and bads in 
society, which in turn naturalizes the existing system of social 
relations and neutralizes the possibilities for radical political 
mobilization. Kelley recently captured this sentiment well, arguing 
that people do not want equality of opportunity in a burning house; 
they just want to build a new house.200 They desire a liberatory 
egalitarianism, not a “brute egalitarianism” that “levels down.”201 
So, for instance, a superficial political response to racial disparities 
in homeownership in the first decade of the 2000s channeled housing 
finance to Black households, a policy championed by the real estate 
finance complex that cashed in on fees before the crash caused a 
 
science generally, and racial disparities in particular, is complicated by the reality that “empirical 
commitments are invariably entangled with normative ones, including commitments more typically 
thought of as ethical or political”). 
 197. Burden-Stelly, supra note 192. 
 198. See Adolph Reed, Jr. & Merlin Chowkwanyun, Race, Class, Crisis: The Discourse of Racial 
Disparity and Its Analytical Discontents, 48 SOCIALIST REG. 149, 167–69 (2012). 
 199. Here, I have Cedric Johnson, Barbara Fields, Karen Fields, Cornel West, and Lester Spence 
especially in mind, notwithstanding the important differences among their own perspectives. 
 200. See Kelley, supra note 194. 
 201. See MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN 
POLITICS 6 (2015) (lamenting how punitive policies that initially targeted Black Americans are being 
applied to other subordinated groups in the United States, such as immigrants and poor Whites). 
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massive destruction of Black wealth.202 A radical approach, focused 
on underlying causes and the broader political economy, would have 
been able to avoid the instrumentalization of the disparity data by the 
exploitative mortgage credit system and focus instead on the larger 
picture of income stagnation, welfare retrenchment, housing debt, 
and rampant financialization.203 The remedy for exclusion should not 
be “predatory inclusion.”204 Episodes like this reveal the dangers that 
attend superficial, potentially co-optative, uses of disparity discourse 
from which a radical approach, attuned to the political economy of 
race, needs to distinguish itself.205 
Reed’s perspective is but one of many in a burgeoning “new 
literature on race and class”206 that can breathe life into this new 
politics. Whether one agrees with him or whether one sees overt 
antiracist politics as mutually reinforcing with—and a necessary 
complement to—an agonistic class politics challenging the 
hegemonic neoliberal order,207 all of the authors contributing to this 
burgeoning literature begin their analysis with a recognition of the 
reciprocal interpenetration of race and class, and invite us to shift the 
terms of the debates around racial disparities in a more radical 
direction.208 They invite us to develop and disseminate what Angela 
Davis calls a new “public vocabulary” that explores the relationships 
between racial disparities and their historical and political–economic 
contexts.209 The degree of diversity of perspectives on these issues 
 
 202. See MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL WEALTH 
GAP 257–61 (2017). 
 203. See Reed & Chowkwanyun, supra note 198. 
 204. See KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL ESTATE 
INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP 5 (2019). 
 205. See MILLS, BLACK RIGHTS/WHITE WRONGS, supra note 52, at 120. 
 206. DAVID ROEDIGER, RACE, CLASS, AND MARXISM 24 (2017). 
 207. Here, I have Michael Dawson, Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Robin Kelley, 
Asad Haider, Charisse Burden-Stelly, David Roediger, and Nancy Fraser especially in mind, 
notwithstanding the important differences among their own perspectives. 
 208. See, e.g., NANCY FRASER & RAHEL JAEGGI, CAPITALISM: A CONVERSATION IN CRITICAL 
THEORY 210 (Brian Milstein ed., 2018) (distinguishing the posture of “progressive moralism” from a 
posture focused on the “fundamental structural bases of social oppression” that takes note of how racism 
is “deeply imbricated with class (and gender) domination”). 
 209. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM AND OTHER DIFFICULT DIALOGUES 173–74 
(2018). 
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testifies to the importance of the theoretical terrain being disputed, as 
well as the potential political energy bursting at its seams. The Black 
Lives Matter movement in general,210 and last summer’s massive 
nationwide protests in particular, should prompt us to think about the 
connections between this theoretical work and what appears to be a 
palpable political rupture, or at least a potential opening for one.211 
A final note is in order regarding the feasibility of a reinvigorated 
radical Black politics, as well as the concrete institutional payoff 
from engaging in it. One might sensibly object that such a politics 
will not, on its own, even come close to dislodging the doxic roots of 
racial hierarchies and White supremacy, much less establishing a new 
egalitarian hegemonic consensus against domination, subordination, 
and exploitation.212 If this all sounds a little utopian, then it is striking 
the right chord. Dawson, for example, expressly frames his call for a 
new oppositional politics in terms of rediscovering the power of 
utopian thinking to motivate vanguard Black politics.213  
Erik Olin Wright’s notion of “real utopias” helps to concretize the 
practice of utopian thinking.214 For Wright, real utopias are “utopian 
ideals that are grounded in the real potentials of humanity, utopian 
destinations that have accessible waystations, utopian designs of 
institutions that can inform our practical tasks of navigating a world 
of imperfect conditions for social change.”215 They are expressions of 
the belief that pragmatic possibility is fixed, at least in part, by the 
limits of our imagination. If nothing else, a reinvigorated Black 
radical politics could advance real utopian thinking and enlarge the 
horizon of the possible, a much-needed tonic to the resigned and 
 
 210. See supra text accompanying note 21. 
 211. See BOURDIEU, supra note 117, at 236 (discussing how transgressions of social frontiers, in 
enacting the unthinkable, have radical, liberatory power, especially during moments of uncertainty and 
crisis within the established order). 
 212. See KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, FROM #BLACKLIVESMATTER TO BLACK LIBERATION 186 
(2016). 
 213. See DAWSON supra note 24, at 175–210. 
 214. See ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, ENVISIONING REAL UTOPIAS 6 (2010). 
 215. Id. See generally RUTGER BREGMAN, UTOPIA FOR REALISTS (Elizabeth Manton trans., 2016) 
(discussing the importance of rediscovering utopian thinking); RUSSELL JACOBY, THE END OF UTOPIA: 
POLITICS AND CULTURE IN AN AGE OF APATHY (1999).  
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melancholic mood of a presentist left politics that struggles to 
imagine alternatives to the status quo.216 Examples abound of 
vanguard movements shifting and shaping politics in moments of 
crisis, including radical Black politics during Reconstruction.217 In 
any event, it taxes credulity to imagine that sticking with the status 
quo institutions and political arguments is less utopian and more 
realistic than a radicalized Black politics if we are measuring success 
against the end goal of reducing people’s precarity, vulnerability, and 
disposability, particularly along racialized lines.218 
Lastly, believing that disparity discourse is best deployed in an 
oppositional, agonistic Black politics does not mean that the politics 
takes place in a silo. Even if it does not primarily address itself to 
White Americans—even if it does not conceive of its primary task as 
one of convincing, eye-opening, implicit-debiasing, and the like—it 
still operates in an irreducibly pluralistic political universe. If we 
credit Mouffe’s account of agonistic pluralism, then all politics 
becomes, at the most fundamental level, coalitional politics.219 And 
to advance your group’s contribution to an agonistic pluralist politics, 
your first task is to form your own coherent and focused group. The 
reference to a coherent and focused group is not meant to endorse the 
view that equates an ascriptive ethnic-racial identity with a natural 
political constituency;220 to the contrary, the politics that is most 
 
 216. See Jon Bekken et al., Democracy and the Left, THE PLATYPUS AFFILIATED SOC’Y (Jun. 2019), 
https://platypus1917.org/2019/06/01/democracy-and-the-left-4/ [https://perma.cc/R5B9-3PH2] 
(transcribing panel remarks discussing utopia and melancholy in left politics today).  
 217. See, e.g., Eric Foner, Rights and the Constitution in Black Life During the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, 74 J. AMER. HIST. 863, 868–69 (1987) (recounting how then-radical demands made by 
influential vanguard Black thought leaders for suffrage for freedmen, equality before the law, school 
desegregation, free public accommodation, and land reform influenced political discourse and achieved 
concrete reform during Reconstruction). 
 218. See Smith & King, supra note 12, at 32. 
 219. See Olúfémi O. Táíwò, Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference, 
THE PHILOSOPHER, https://www.thephilosopher1923.org/essay-taiwo [https://perma.cc/6RCE-DTZK]; 
Olúfémi O. Táíwò, Identity Politics and Elite Capture, BOS. REV. (May 7, 2020), 
http://bostonreview.net/race/olufemi-o-taiwo-identity-politics-and-elite-capture [https://perma.cc/GHZ4-
7RMB]. 
 220. Cedric Johnson, The Panthers Can’t Save Us Now, CATALYST, https://catalyst-
journal.com/vol1/no1/panthers-cant-save-us-cedric-johnson [https://perma.cc/7KMS-WVNS] 
(criticizing the “specious view that effective politics should be built on the grounds of ethnic affinity 
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interesting and promising draws on the ample Black radical tradition 
that has always operated, with intermittent fits and starts, as an 
“immanent critique of American claims to universality.”221 In belying 
and demystifying the claims to universality of American institutions, 
it makes an overture to the other pluralistic groups—including 
immigrants, economically disadvantaged White Americans, and 
religious minorities—that occupy space on the “chain of 
equivalence” of subordinated social groups.222 It also bears emphasis 
that the practice of exposing the arbitrariness of racialized hierarchies 
should facilitate the forging of solidaristic bonds across these 
marginalized groups. Indeed, it invites everyone to actively achieve 
the solidarity on which a new egalitarian hegemonic bloc could be 
built.223 Paradoxically, building solidarity through primarily 
non-discursive political strategies in this manner might also build a 
firmer lifeworld consensus that could serve as the foundation for 
future discursive consensus concerning important political matters.224 
The motif of a political vanguard coalescing around disadvantaged 
social strata has informed radical social and political theory for at 
least two generations,225 in specific articulations such as “new social 
 
rather than discrete political interests”).  
 221. SINGH, supra note 17. 
 222. See supra note 179 and accompanying text (discussing Mouffe and Laclau’s idea of the “chain of 
equivalence”). 
 223. See CHANDRA TALPADE MOHANTY, FEMINISM WITHOUT BORDERS: DECOLONIZING THEORY, 
PRACTICING SOLIDARITY 7 (2003). 
 224. See supra Parts II, III (explaining current ineffectualness of discursively-framed politics 
concerning racialized disparities in the United States). 
 225. Marcuse’s famous conclusion to One-Dimensional Man is one of the earliest expressions of this 
idea: 
However, underneath the conservative popular base is the substratum of the outcasts 
and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colors, the 
unemployed and the unemployable. They exist outside the democratic process; their 
life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending intolerable conditions 
and institutions. Thus their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is 
not. Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore not deflected by 
the system; it is an elementary force which violates the rules of the game and, in 
doing so, reveals it as a rigged game. . . . The fact that they start refusing to play the 
game may be the fact which marks the beginning of the end of a period.  
HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN 260–61 (2d ed. 1991) (1965). 
57
Weber: Against Discourse
Published by Reading Room, 2021
1234 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:4 
movements,”226 “emergent cultural practices,”227 and “the 
multitude,”228 to name just a few. Perhaps the best illustration of the 
generative openness of the radical Black politics pertinent to this 
Essay is Richard Wright’s 1957 quip: “Isn’t it clear to you that the 
American Negro is the only group in our nation that consistently and 
passionately raises the question of freedom? The voice of the 
American Negro is rapidly becoming the most representative voice of 
America and of oppressed people anywhere in the world.”229 
In closing, I want to return to Stuart Hall, who, as noted earlier, 
argued that modern politics is the art of developing a set of common, 
shared images that galvanize new hegemonic majorities, new social 
blocs of always changing interest groups.230 The precise stock of 
images that a reinvigorated radical Black politics might summon is 
beyond the scope of this Essay, except that racial disparity data will 
probably have a moderate, but not a decisive, role to play in its 
development. I suspect that this new politics, conceiving of itself as 
an agonistic project making demands and largely eschewing attempts 
to change minds, offers a good, if not the best, chance to develop an 
ideological imaginary up to the task of undermining the arbitrary 
racialized disparities that pervade our present conjuncture.  
 
 226. CARL BOGGS, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL POWER: EMERGING FORMS OF RADICALISM 
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